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ABSTRACT 
This thesis contains four essays, of varying length, on the general theme of labour 
demand. An initial Overview describes the subjects of the different essays, and the 
links between them. Each essay also contains its own, more detailed, abstract. 
Part A considers the question 'Why Has Wage Inequality Risen Most Where 
Wage Shares Have Fallen Least? ' hi recent decades, most developed countries have 
experienced rising wage inequality and falling wage shares. The same causes have 
often been blamed for both trends. It is observed, however, that wage inequality has 
risen the most in those countries where wage shares have fallen the least, and vice-
versa. The majority of existing theories are either theoretically or empirically unable to 
explain this puzzling relationship, which deserves much more attention than it has 
received. 
Part B combines the two shortest essays, 'A Note on the Elasticity of Demand 
for Homogenous Labour ' and 'A Note on Immigration and Average Wages ' . These 
argue, respectively, that commonly used labour demand elasticity formulae derived 
from the microeconomic conditions of a single industry are inappropriate for most 
macroeconomic applications, and that immigration should be considered as a shock to 
the growth rate of the labour force, rather than its level. 
Part C asks 'Why Don ' t Relative Wages Affect Employment (Very Much)? ' It 
argues that several common explanations for these findings lack sufficient evidence to 
be persuasive, and proposes an alternative: that the demand for labour is much less 
elastic at the occupational level than at the aggregate level. This hypothesis is shown to 
be consistent with a range of stylized facts about the labour market, while the rival 
explanations are not. 
The Last Words offer some reflections on the findings, both empirical and 
theoretical, of the preceding essays, and their more general implications. 
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OVERVIEW 
One might be forgiven for thini<ing that labour demand is presently something of a 
backwater in economics. It doesn't even rate an entry in the New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics. The basic theory of labour as a derived demand is a simple combination 
of the most fundamental consumer and producer theory. Surely the subject was given 
its canonical treatment by Hicks' Theory of Wages in 1932, and wrapped up by 
Hamermesh's Labor Demand in 1993? Perhaps there remain some arguments about the 
exact value of particular elasticities, the length of the appropriate adjustment times, or 
the effects of technological change. Yet this hardly adds up to a situation of basic 
uncertainty in which the big questions are yet to be answered. 
Despite this state of academic quiescence, however, on practical questions 
debate is still very much alive. We woiry about rising wage inequality and falling wage 
shares, but we are uncertain about the causes and even more so about the remedies. 
There is still heated argument over the effects of minimum wages and immigration. 
And even theoretically, we seem unsure of the applicability of the most basic 
assumptions underlying what we think we know. Perhaps employers are not price-
takers in the labour market, or a worker's marginal productivity is a function of the 
wage as well as vice-versa. This thesis attempts to explore some of these still 
unanswered questions, to offer some answers, or at least define more clearly what 
problems need to be solved. 
Part A, 'Why Has Wage Inequality Risen Most Where Wage Shares Have Fallen 
Least?' considers a puzzling and under-appreciated feature of the modern labour 
market. In recent decades, most developed economies have experienced rising wage 
inequality and falling wage shares. Both trends, particularly the rise in inequality, have 
received a large amount of attention in the literature. Moreover, the same list of culprits 
commonly gets the blame: globalisation, technological change, and the weakening of 
labour market institutions. Yet it has not been widely observed that the increase in 
wage inequality has been the largest in those countries where the fall in the wage share 
has been the smallest, and vice-versa. This observation makes it difficult to blame both 
trends on the same set of forces. 
After documenting and checking the robustness of this surprising correlation, the 
essay develops two theoretically consistent explanations: one based on capital 
accumulation, and the other on the behaviour of the highest labour incomes. The 
empirical evidence, however, is not found to be particularly supportive of either. It also 
becomes evident that the changes in the wage share are much harder to explain than the 
changes in wage inequality. These results clearly point to an important and neglected 
phenomenon which current theory struggles to rationalise. 
Part B consists of 'Two Notes on Labour Demand'. The first Note takes up a 
recent debate over how to turn elasticities of substitution between capital and labour 
into elasticities of demand for labour suitable for use at a macroeconomic level. It 
argues that standard microeconomic formulae are only applicable at a larger scale under 
very special conditions. The other enters the controversy regarding the effect of 
immigration on the wages of native workers in the host country. It is suggested that, 
along with the effect on relative wages emphasised by recent literature, there is a 
potentially significant effect on average wages when immigration is considered as a 
more rapid rate of growth in the labour force, rather than a level shock. 
Part C, 'Why Don't Relative Wages Affect Employment (Very Much)? ' , 
considers the employment penalties (or lack thereof) of min imum wages and other 
institutional wage floors affect. There is a large amount of evidence showing that the 
employment penalties of these interventions are small or nonexistent. The common 
reactions to this evidence are either to question its validity, or to throw out the price-
taking, market-clearing 'neoclassical' model of the labour market and replace it with 
something else. As suggested above, monopsony and efficiency wage theory are 
popular candidates, along with aggregate demand. The approach taken here, by 
contrast, is to take the evidence seriously, but to seek for an explanation in the 
substitution possibilities (or lack thereof) inherent in production technology and 
consumer preferences, rather than some peculiar feature of the employment relationship 
or the labour market in general. In particular, it is useful to consider the demand for 
labour in particular occupations, rather than for particular personal characteristics - to 
focus on the job to be done rather than the worker doing it. Under the hypothesis that 
the demand for labour at this level is highly inelastic, a range of otherwise puzzling 
features of the labour market can be explained. 
Besides the overarching theme of labour demand, it will be seen that Part C 
relies on empirical and theoretical results from Parts A and B. In particular, the model 
of capital-skill complementarity from chapter A3, the empirical results from chapter A4, 
and the elasticities of labour demand from chapters B1 and B2 are all used, h should 
also be noted that, because of the unequal size of the different essays, they have been 
treated somewhat differently when converted into thesis form. Part A is in fairly 
conventional article format, with each section simply turned into a chapter. The two 
shorter papers in Part B are each presented complete in a single chapter. Part C is 
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PART A 
WHY HAS WAGE INEQUALITY FALLEN MOST 
WHERE WAGE SHARES HAVE FALLEN LEAST? 
In recent decades, most developed countries have experienced rising wage inequality 
and falling wage shares. Both trends are often blamed on globalisation, technological 
change, and weakening labour market institutions. This paper shows, however, that 
wage inequality has risen the most in those countries where wage shares have fallen the 
least, and vice-versa. A range of potential explanations are considered. As part of this, 
a new production function which combines capital-skill complementari ty with an easy 
to calculate labour share is developed, and bottom 99% wage shares are calculated f rom 
newly available top incomes data. These and other existing theories, however, seem 
empirically unable to explain this puzzling relationship. 
m 
CHAPTER Al. INTRODUCTION 
Wage inequality has risen considerably in many developed countries over the last few 
decades. The causes of this rise have been the subject of much debate, especially in the 
United States, where the trend has been particulariy strong. Initially, expanded 
international trade and capital mobility were the main suspects. As the debate evolved, 
the focus shifted towards skill biased technical change and capital accumulation. More 
recently, the weakening of labour market institutions such as unions, minimum wages, 
and social norms for executive pay have received attention, as has the role of 
immigration. All of these interpretations still have their defenders and detractors - see 
Gordon and Dew-Becker (2008) for a survey, or Machin (2008) for a more international 
flavour. 
In the same period, the share of wages in gross domestic product, i.e. the labour 
share, has been falling in many countries, particularly in continental Europe. 
Interestingly, proposed explanations fall into much the same categories as those for 
increasing wage inequality: globalisation, technology, and institutions (e.g. Jaumotte 
and Tytell 2007, Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003). 
It would seem natural to consider these two trends together rather than 
separately. After all, they are both outcomes of the same structural processes: the 
interactions among labour supply, labour demand, and institutions that determine 
employment and wages. Moreover, exactly the same theories have been advanced to 
explain both rising wage inequality and falling wage shares. Yet these phenomena have 
very rarely been analysed jointly. Checchi and Garcia (2005, 2008) are an exception, 
integrating both wage inequality and the wage share in their analysis of overall income 
inequality. They do not, however, make any specific comparison of the trends in wage 
inequality and wage shares across different countries. Such a comparison is the starting 
point for this paper. 
Chapter A2 describes recent changes in wage inequality and wage shares, and 
more importantly, the relationship between those changes. In a sample of eleven O E C D 
countries from the 197()s onwards, wage inequality has risen in most countries, and the 
wage share has fallen in all. Surprisingly, however, wage inequality has risen the most 
in precisely those countries where wage shares have fallen the least, while wage shares 
have fallen the most where inequality is stable or even falling. This pattern is hard to 
reconcile with the claim that the same forces are largely responsible for both rising 
wage inequality and falling wage shares. 
Individually, these country differences have not gone unnoticed in the literature. 
While the emphasis has been on rising wage inequality in the United States and falling 
wage shares in Europe and elsewhere, there has been some discussion of the dogs that 
did not bark - stable European wage inequality and the muted fall in the wage share in 
the US. Since inequality and shares have been discussed as separate subjects, however, 
the full significance of these facts has perhaps not been appreciated. Hornstein, Krusell 
and Violante (2002) mention the contrasting trends in the two variables, but only for the 
United States compared to continental Europe as a whole, and the observation did not 
survive the transition from working paper to journal article (2007). This paper, by 
contrast, shows that the relationship holds for a sample which includes several 
continental countries individually, as well as other English-speaking and Asian 
economies, and argues that it is an important puzzle to be solved before any explanation 
of the individual trends can be truly convincing. 
Chapter A3 then contrasts this finding with the explanations for rising wage 
inequality and falling wage shares given in the literature. Some of these - globalisation, 
technology, institutions and education - seem to imply that higher inequality should be 
correlated with lower wage shares, since they are cited as causes of both trends. Other 
factors such as capital accumulation, top wages, product market competition, and 
vintage capital, seem more promising as an explanation of our puzzle, since they at least 
have the potential to move wage inequality and wage shares in the same direction. 
Along with an assessment of the explanations offered in the literature on these 
topics, this chapter presents a new theoretical framework for the analysis of capital-skill 
complementarity, and an alternative measure of labour incomes. Firstly, a two-level, 3-
factor modified CES production function is introduced, which combines capital-skill 
complementarity with a simple expression for the wage share. Previous production 
•functions have generally had one or the other property, but not both, making them 
difficult to use when analysing both phenomena simultaneously. Secondly, extending 
the work of Glyn (2009) for the United States, bottom 99% wage shares are calculated 
for eight OECD countries using top incomes data collected in Leigh (2007). This 
measure gives a better picture of what is happening to the mass of labour incomes than 
wage shares inclusive of the highest earners, whose incomes have expanded 
dramatically in some countries, and should arguably be placed in a different category. 
Chapter A4 brings these different explanations together using panel regressions. 
The main aim is not to differentiate between the variables individually (although some 
attempts are made in this direction), but to see whether, as a group, they can explain the 
puzzle documented in chapter A2, at least in an accounting sense. Equations for wage 
inequality and wage shares are estimated jointly using seemingly unrelated regression, 
and both the levels of and changes in the residuals are tested to see whether there is 
some relationship between wage inequality and wage shares that is not being captured 
by the standard set of regression variables. 
The main findings are that the changes in wage inequality across countries are 
much better explained by our set of explanatory variables than the changes in wage 
shares, both in terms of statistical fit and theoretical plausibility. Furthermore, the 
puzzle is only 'explained' to the extent that there is a correlation between lower wage 
shares and a higher level of educational attainment. When this variable alone is 
removed from the analysis, or an alternative measure of education is used, the 
correlation between higher wage inequality and higher wage shares is almost as strong 
as in the raw data, and most of the models' explanatory power over changes in the wage 
share disappears. The bottom 99% wage shares calculated in chapter A4 show smaller 
absolute differences between countries than the full wage share, but they do not seem to 
diminish the strength of the correlation between inequality and shares. Chapter A5 
recapitulates these findings and sets forth some tentative suggestions for further work. 
CHAPTER A2. THE PUZZLE 
We begin with a description of recent trends in wage inequality and wage shares, and 
the relationship between them. Our data covers eleven countries: Australia, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Japan, (South) Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. These are the only countries for which both 
variables of interest are available from at least the 1980s onwards, which unfortunately 
excludes significant economies such as Canada and Italy. Germany is also excluded 
because of the problems of accurately accounting for reunification. The wage share is 
from the European Commission, and is adjusted for self employment and nonwage 
compensation. The wage inequality measure is the ratio between the 9th and 1st full-
time earnings deciles, for both sexes combined, from the OECD. (Note that, since the 
ratio is based on full time earnings, it should not be affected by changes in hours 
worked.) A more detailed description of these and all variables used subsequently is 
given in the Data Appendix which follows chapter A5. 
The progression of wage inequality (as measured by the 9th/lst earnings decile 
ratio, henceforth 9/1 decile ratio) over time is shown in Figure A. l . It is rising over 
time or stable in most countries, except for France, where it has declined, and Korea, 
which shows a striking U-shaped pattern. There is also a great range in levels, from 
around 2 in Finland and the Netherlands to nearly 5 in the United States at the end of the 
sample. The Korean data seems somewhat dubious in its uniformity early in the period. 
The wage share is shown below in Figure A.2. Across the whole sample, it is 
generally falling almost uniformly for the period shown. Again, Korea stands out, this 
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F i g u r e A . l : Wage inequality, 1975-2007. 
t ime for the extremely high level of the wage share. By contrast, the wage share in New 
Zealand is unusually low, averaging below 50%. The importance of agriculture in this 
economy may lead a high proportion of land rents in income, or a high level of self-
employment which would amplify any imperfect ions in the relevant adjustment . 
Whatever the reasons that cause the levels of the wage share in Korea and New 
Zealand to be unusual, we will see that the changes over t ime seem to be within the 
range of the rest of the sample. Since the analysis in this and subsequent chapters relies 
upon first differences, t ime trends and country fixed effects, rather than the absolute 
level of the wage share, these countries were retained, at least for some purposes. 
The focus of this paper, however, is not the trends in wage inequality and wage 
shares individually, but rather how these trends relate to each other. Figure A.3 plots 
the changes (first di f ferences) in these variables for each country f rom 1980 to 2000. 
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Figure A .2: Wage shares, 1975-2007. 
The resuhs are clear cut, and on reflection, surprising. Where wage inequality has risen 
the most, in the United States, the wage share has fallen the least. By contrast, wage 
inequality has been stable or even falling in Korea, Japan, France and Finland, which 
have experienced some of the largest falls in the wage share. The size of the differences 
are not trivial, either: the wage share has fallen by nearly ten percent of G D P in these 
countries (15% in Korea), while in the United States, the fall was just over three 
percentage points. Wage inequality, as measured by the 9/1 decile ratio, fell by 0.2 in 
France and over 0.5 in Korea, while it rose by 0.7 in the United States. Compare this to 
the unweighted arithmetic means of the two changes, which are an increase of 0.2 for 
the decile ratio and a fall of nearly 8 percentage points for the wage share. The 
variation between countries is clearly larger than the overall trends which have received 
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Figure A.3: Changes in wage inequality and wage shares, 1980-2000. 
so much attention. One may roughly say that the English-speaking economies have 
seen bigger rises in wage inequality and smaller falls in the wage share than continental 
Europe and Asia, but the relationship seems to hold within these groups as well as 
between them. Compare, say, Australia to the UK and US, or Denmark to the rest of 
Europe. 
Why is this so surprising? If rising wage inequality and falling wage shares 
were being driven by the same forces, such as a common shock from globalisation or 
technological change, and these forces were similar in their impact across countries, one 
would expect all countries to have a similar experience: Figure A.3 should be a single 
dot, or tight ball. If the same forces were at work, but operating with different strengths 
or timing across countries - some countries may be more or less open to the world 
economy, adopt new technology at a different pace, or have different institutions -
Figure A.3 should slope m the opposite direction, with large rises in wage inequality 
Table A . l : Changes in wage shares and wage inequahty, rank correlations. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ~ 
Period 1980-2004 1980-2000 1980-2004 1980-2004 1975-2005 
Kende i r s tau-a 0.82 0.67 0.82 0.79 0.71 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Observations 10 10 10 8 I j 
Both tau-a and tau-b were calculated, but in almost all cases they were equal to two decimal places. 
P-values are for a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the rank correlation is zero. 
Column (3) uses wage shares at factor cost, column (4) earnings deciles for men only, and column (5) 
linear time trends instead of first differences. 
Male earnings deciles unavailable for Korea and the Netherlands. New Zealand included in time trend. 
correlated with larger falls in the wage share. Even if the trends were driven by totally 
independent forces, or if the data was of such low quality as to be meaningless, one 
would expect merely a lack of any discernible pattern. 
To confirm that this result stands up to more formal statistical analysis, and is 
robust to the choice of time period and data, we use Kendall's tau rank correlations^ and 
several variations on the specification in Figure A.3: 2004 instead of 2000 as an end 
point (the longest time period for which data is available for all countries except New 
Zealand), linear time trends (fitted by ordinary least squares) for the period 1975-2005, 
earnings deciles for men only rather than both sexes,"^ and wage shares measured at 
factor cost instead of market prices. While there are minor differences between these 
specifications, as can be seen in Table A.l , the central finding is robust: a strong 
positive correlation at a very high level of statistical significance.'^ Indeed, the 
correlation (as well as the absolute size of the changes) is even stronger over the longer 
time periods 1980-2004 and 1975-2005. The period 1980-2000 is used in Figure A.3 
- Kendall 's tau is calculated according to a formula based on the rank order of the observations. It is 
more robust to outliers and non-linear relationships than the standard correlation coefficient, but the 
interpretation is still -i-l for a perfect positive correlation, -1 for a perfect negative correlation and 0 for a 
complete lack of correlation. See e.g. Kruskal (1958) for further discussion. 
' The only justification for not using both sexes combined is that the composition of the labour force may 
have changed with the increased employment of women. Under this scenario, the female earnings deciles 
would be affected by composition effects, and therefore not as u.seful. 
'' As shown in chapter A4, this result is also robust to dropping Korea from the sample. Note also that a 
positive correlation between changes in wage inequality and wage shares is equivalent to the more 
intuitive statement that wage inequality has risen the most where wage shares have fallen the least. 
only to facilitate comparison with the top incomes data later in the paper. 
Table A.2: Changes in wage shares and wage inequality (shorter periods). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Period 1980-1990 1990-2000 1990-2004 
1980-2000 
Kendell's tau-a 0.20 -0.07 0.05 -0.09 
p-value 0.47 0.81 0.88 0.79 
Observations 10 11 11 10 
Column (4) uses differences-in-differences tor 1990-2000 vs 1980-1990. 
The result is not so robust, however, when shorter time periods are used. As 
reported in Table A.2, when the sample is split into two ten year periods 1980-90 and 
1990-2000, the rank correlation between changes in wage inequality and wage shares in 
different countries becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero. The same is true 
when the later period is extended to 2004, and when differences-in-differences is used 
to examine the within country variation across the two time periods. The differences-in-
differences are calculated as (y'2000-yl990)-{yl990-yl980), where >' is wage inequality 
or the wage shares for the given year. Whereas the simple changes and time trends 
focus on between country variation in a single time period, the differences-in-
differences approach measures whether, for each country, wage inequality rose more or 
less in those periods where wage shares fell more. 
Why does the correlation that is so strong over the full length of our data 
become so weak in the shorter sub-periods (i.e. at higher frequencies)? This depends on 
what is driving the correlation, which is almost certainly spurious in the sense that a 
direct causal relationship from wage inequality to wage shares, or vice-versa, is 
extremely unlikely. It is more plausible that there was some common force pushing 
wage inequality and wage shares in the same direction, or that the forces causing rising 
wage inequality and falling wage shares were distinct, but happened to vary inversely in 
strength across countries so as produce the pattern we observe. If a common force did 
exist, the results for the sub-periods may be biased towards zero by measurement error, 
which is more significant when the true changes are smaller, or we may be confounded 
by temporary cyclical disturbances, which are also likely to be more important over a 
shorter period. If the forces were distinct, then both the sub- and full period results 
simply reflect whatever was happening to the separate forces in each period. O f course, 
the two options are not mutually exclusive. 
W e are still left, however, with the fact that wage inequality rose the most in 
those countries where wage shares fell the least, and vice-versa, over a period of twenty 
years and more. It is not the purpose of this paper to argue that this is a general law true 
for all countries, in all time periods, and at all frequencies. Rather, it is to document the 
pattern as a historical fact, and explore its implications for various theories which have 
been put forward regarding its constituent phenomena. For this purpose, the 
observation that the pattern becomes weaker at higher frequencies is interesting, 
perhaps, but not of overwhelming importance. If we wish to explain why wage shares 
tended to fall and wage inequality tended to rise in developed countries around the end 
of the twentieth century, our theory should be consistent with the fact that the strength 
of those two trends was inversely correlated across countries. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, this is not a trivial challenge. 

CHAPTER A3. SUGGESTED EXPLANATIONS 
In our sample of O E C D countries over the last few decades, wage inequality has 
generally been rising and wage shares falling. We have seen, however, that the rise in 
wage inequality has been largest in those countries where the fall in the wage share has 
been the smallest, and vice-versa. Keeping this result in mind, we now discuss various 
causes that have been proposed for rising wage inequality and falling wage shares, and 
focus on whether they can account for the negative correlation between the two trends. 
While the wage inequality literature is vast, its main themes are fairly few. The 
following discussion relies on the surveys of Gordon and Dew-Becker (2008) and 
Machin (2008). Since the wage share literature is smaller, relevant papers are cited 
individually. It must be emphasized that the following is a description of common 
arguments that have been put forward in the literature, not an endorsement of them. 
Many, if not most, have been criticized on empirical or theoretical grounds. 
We begin with globalisation, technology, and institutions. These three are 
probably the most common suggested causes of rising wage inequality and falling wage 
shares. Precisely because they are used to explain both trends, however, they seem 
unpromising candidates to explain our puzzle. The same comment applies to education. 
We then move on to other causes - capital accumulation, the movement of top labour 
incomes, product market regulation and vintage capital - which have more potential to 
move wage shares and inequality in the same direction, or at least affect one while 
leaving the other unchanged. The section on capital accumulation introduces a novel 
production function which combines capital-skill complementari ty with a simple 
expression for the wage share, and bottom 99% wage shares for eight countries are 
calculated as part of the discussion of top labour incomes. 
Globalisation is a catch-all term used to cover increases in capital mobility, 
international trade, and immigration, since both the logic and effects are similar. In all 
cases, globalisation tends to help the relatively abundant factor, and hurt the relatively 
scarce factor. This may be through factor mobility directly changing relative factor 
supplies, or through trade replicating these effects according to the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theorem. As Jaumotte and Tytell (2007:5) put it: "the effective global labor supply 
quadrupled between 1980 and 2005 . . . Advanced economies can access this increased 
pool of global labor both through imports of goods and services and through 
immigration." In the case of a developed country, capital is abundant relative to labour, 
and skilled labour relative to unskilled. Therefore, it is argued, globalisation will reduce 
the wage share and increase wage inequality. Making these assertions simultaneously 
would logically require a 3-factor model, but since they are usually presented 
separately, 2-factor logic usually prevails. Some complications of the 3-factor setting 
are explored below in the section on capital accumulation. Another caveat is that factor 
mobility would not necessarily lead to a change in the wage share of GDP, as opposed 
to wage rates, depending on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. 
Since in fact capital has tended to flow towards more developed countries, particularly 
the United States, this should not be an issue in any case, but immigration may be more 
important. 
Technology has often been cited as a driver for wage inequality - skill biased 
technical change has raised the demand for skilled workers relative to unskilled, while 
the supply has not kept up. Hence wages for skilled workers have increased relative to 
those for unskilled workers. It is also possible that technological change affects the 
wage share, although the effect is theoretically indeterminate, depending on whether 
capital or labour is being augmented/saved, and the relevant elasticities of substitution. 
Bentolia and St Paul (2003) and Guscina (2006) both argue that technical change has 
been biased in favour of capital in the relevant time period. 
Institutions, like globalisation, is something of a catch-all term. With respect to 
the labour market, it is usually used to refer to various aspects of employment law and 
regulations (e.g. minimum wages, collective bargaining, employment protection, 
unemployment benefits), as well as social norms regarding fair pay levels. In general, 
these institutions are considered to alter the relative power of different parties within 
some kind of implicit or explicit bargaining framework. A stronger bargaining position 
for either party leads almost tautologically to a larger share of the surplus. These 
institutions are generally considered to favour lower paid workers, so that their 
weakening is seen as a cause of rising wage inequality. A more sophisticated argument 
is that a common shock such as globalisation or technology will have less effect on 
inequality where institutions are stronger. Similar arguments have been advanced for 
labour as a whole vs. capital, so that weaker institutions would lower the wage share 
(e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003, and Bental and Demougin 2006). 
Education has also been cited, although less commonly, as a factor affecting both 
wage inequality and the wage share. If an increase in the demand for skilled labour 
tends to increase wage inequality, an increase in the supply of skilled labour should 
logically reduce it. Daudey and Decreause (2006) argue that an higher supply of 
education will also increase the labour share by making workers more mobile. 
Not surprisingly, these four factors have been commonly cited as causes of both 
falling wage shares and rising wage inequality. Globalisation, technology, and 
insititutions in particular have simple, appealing theoretical arguments behind them as 
well as plausible empirical support in the general direction of change in the world 
economy. Yet, to repeat, it is precisely because they can explain both trends that they 
cannot explain why the strength of the two trends are inversely correlated across 
countries. They remain as potentially significant in explaining the overall average 
trends. After all, despite the large amount of variation in our sample, all countries 
experienced a falling wage share, and a majority rising wage inequality. But if we are 
interested in moving beyond the average trend to explain to explain the differences 
between countries, we must look for additional factors, or argue that the forces 
emphasised in the literature do not affect both wage inequality and wage shares in the 
directions they are supposed to. We now turn to several alternative possibilities. 
The degree of product market competition may be an important factor. If firms 
have monopoly power, they will increase their profits by restricting output (and thus 
labour demand) relative to the competitive level. Conversely, more competitive product 
markets should increase the wage share (Ripatti and Vilmunen 2001). The effect on 
wage inequality is less clear, but Lindsey (2009) argues that more competitive markets 
may undermine other institutions that support income compression. But it is also less 
clear what the effect of competition on the wage share is if monopoly rents are shared 
with unions. 
Vintage capital is incorporated in a search model by Hornstein, Krusell and 
Violante (2007), who show that the effect of an increase in the rate of capital-embodied 
technical progress depends on the level of regulation of the economy. Qualitatively, 
they find that the more regulated economy should experience a greater fall in the labour 
share, but their quantitative simulations calibrated to the United States and Europe show 
practically no difference. An earlier version of the paper (2002) does a better job 
matching the wage shares but is less successful on other dimensions. This early version 
also argues that wage inequality would increase more in the less regulated economy as a 
result of the same shock, but this was not included in the published version (and again, 
the quantitative results were small). Although this particular model does not seem 
capable of accounting for the puzzle, it is an interesting example of the more general 
point that a common shock may affect different countries in different ways, depending 
on their institutions. 
Capital accumulation could affect the wage share depending on the elasticity of 
substitution between labour and capital. A value of one for this elasticity (as in a Cobb-
Douglas production function) implies constant factor shares, inespect ive of the capital-
labour ratio. As shown below, if the value is below one, the wage share rises with the 
capital-labour ratio; above one, and it falls. This conclusion is, however, conditional on 
accumulation being exogenous with respect to technical progress. If it is instead a 
response to labour augmenting technical progress, factor shares will remain constant 
whatever the elasticity of substitution (Arpaia, Perez and Pichelmann 2009). Andersen, 
Klau & Yndggard (1999), Checchi and Garcia (2005), and Chirinko (2008) all argue 
that the literature supports an elasticity of less than 1, although Bentolia and Saint-Paul 
(2003) present a range of estimates on either side. Shifting our attention to wage 
inequality, capital and skilled labour are generally considered to be complements 
(Hamermesh 1993), so that capital accumulation should increase the relative demand 
for, and hence the wages of, skilled labour, all else being equal. 
A New Model of Capital-Skill Complementarity 
A combination of these two mechanisms - an elasticity of substitution between capital 
and labour of less than one, and capital skill complementari ty - would imply that capital 
accumulation can potentially increase both wage inequality and the wage share, thus 
providing a potential solution to our puzzle. The problem is that insights f rom a 2 factor 
setting do not always transfer smoothly when 3 factors are considered. The preferred 
way of modell ing capital-skill complementari ty is to aggregate capital K and skilled 
labour S, and then combine this aggregate with unskilled labour U i.e. 
y = w h e r e / a n d g are CES funct ions (Krusell et al 2000). This funct ion 
displays capital-skill complementar i ty as long as the elasticity of substitution between K 
and S i n / i s less than the elasticity of substitution between U a n d / i n g. Unfortunately, 
analysing changes in the wage share (the sum of the skilled and unskilled labour shares, 
or residual f rom the capital share) is very difficult without detailed numerical simulation 
(Arpaia, Perez and Pichelmann 2009). The more conventional route of aggregating 
skilled and unskilled labour first i.e. Y = g [ A ' , / ( ( / , 5 ) ] makes the labour share and the 
skill p remium (i.e. wage inequality) simpler to obtain, but since both kinds of labour are 
identical with respect to capital in the standard formulation, capital-skill 
complementar i ty drops out of the model. 
W e now develop a simple f ramework that provides both capital-skill 
complementar i ty and a simple expression for the wage share. Assume that output is 
given by a CES production function in capital and aggregate labour, 
Y ^A ( A . l ) 
where 0 < a < 1 and p <\. The marginal product of labour condition W - Y , yields 
Combin ing this with (A. l ) , we obtain 
WL _ (l-fl)L" 
Y aK'+O-cOL" 
Or, writing ^ J o r the wage share WL/Y and k for the capital-labour ratio K/L, 
(A.2) 
-a 
Taking the derivative with respect to k, 
dsi^ _ -a . / f a pk './'-I -a 
(A.3) 
dk \ - a 
The effect of the capital-labour ratio on the wage share will depend on the sign o f / ; . 
Since ( ) < « < 1 , and A > 0 , we have if p<(). But since the elasticity of dk 
substitution between capital and labour is a - — ' — , this is equivalent to <7 < 1. An \ - p 
elasticity of substitution of less than one implies that an increase in the capital-labour 
ratio will increase the wage share. 
As mentioned above, this is true for an exogenous increase in k, but not for one 
that is induced by labour-augmenting technical progress. This can be seen if we write 
/l^, and A., as the parameters for capital- and labour-augmenting technology 
respectively, and replace K and L in equation (A.! ) by their technology augmented 
versions Xf,K and i ^ L (which renders the p a r a m e t e r r e d u n d a n t ) . Then we must 
replace k in equations (A.2) and (A.3) above with [X^./X^^k. It is obvious that if an 
increase in k is merely proportional to an increase in /I, , then it does not affect the 
labour share. 
That the effect of k on s\ depends on the value of a is a standard result for a 2-
factor production function. We now show that the result is also applicable to a 3-factor 
production function with skilled and unskilled labour. Suppose that the labour input is 
itself a CES aggregate of skilled and unskilled labour {S and U), 
L = B p S ' + i \ - b ) U ' ' \ ' > (A.4) 
0 < < 1 and 6 < \ . The demand for skilled labour relative to unskilled is given by 
U 
h W 
•• , (A.5) 
where Ws and Wu are the wage rates for skilled and unskilled labour respectively (the 
ratio of which is the measure of wage inequality). The novelty is to impose b - b{k) 
with — > 0 I n s t e a d of the elasticities of substitution determining capital-skill 
dk 
complementar i ty , in this formulation it is the share coefficient b(k) that does the work. 
Then, an increase in the capital-labour ratio will increase the relative demand for skilled 
labour: 
d 
dk U 
1 S 'lb n > 0 . (A.6) 
b{\-b){\-e)U dk 
Graphically, an increase in the capital-labour ratio will shift outwards the relative 
demand curve for skilled labour and thus increase its relative wage, as long as the 
relative supply of skilled labour is not perfectly elastic. 
To round out the story, a tendency towards a lower wage share could be 
represented as a rise in a. From (A.2) we see that 
ds, _ -k' '' 
-a 
< 0 . (A.7) 
da (l-af/ 
Say that all countries have a common technology, which has changed over t ime in some 
way that implies a lower wage share. Simultaneously, different countries are 
accumulat ing capital at different rates. Those countries that, for whatever reason, 
experienced a more rapid accumulation of capital (for a given rate of labour augment ing 
For t ractabi l i ty , it is eas ies t to a s s u m e that k is e x o g e n o u s e .g. in a S o l o w - S w a n s teady state . If this is 
not the case , then a c h a n g e in b. which most hke iy al ters the equ i l ib r ium value of L will have f e e d b a c k 
e f f ec t s on k. H o w e v e r , it s e e m s plaus ib le to a s s u m e that an initial increase in k wou ld not c ause f e e d b a c k 
e f f ec t s that resul t in k fa l l ing b e l o w its s tar t ing value, s ince the on ly f eedback m e c h a n i s m is the c h a n g e in 
b resul t ing f r o m the initial increase in k. 
technical progress), would see their capital-labour ratio rise, which would increase both 
the wage share according to (A.3) and the relative demand for skilled labour (and hence 
wage inequality) according to (A.6). Thus this country could end up with increasing 
wage inequality but a fairly stable wage share (as in the United States), while those 
countries with lower capital accumulation would not experience a rise in wage 
inequality, but would see their wage shares fall by more (as in Japan). Admittedly, 
hypothetical changes in the parameter a are a somewhat arbitrary method of 
fornialisation, but this device is only employed to generate a common trend towards a 
lower wage share. The differences between countries, which are our main interest, are 
entirely driven by the effects of capital accumulation in this exercise. 
Bottom 99% Wage Shares 
The wage share may include significant incomes that should more properly be classed 
separately from the income of the mass of workers. We may very broadly say that the 
English-speaking countries - Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the 
United States - have seen greater rises in wage inequality and smaller falls in the wage 
share when compared with Europe (except Denmark) and Japan. It is well known that 
these are also the countries where the trend towards increasing CEO pay has been the 
strongest (Gabaix and Landier 2008). More generally, many refer to a distinct Anglo-
Saxon form of capitalism, with features such as a reliance on financial markets over 
banking,*' more dispersed shareholding (Morck 2009), and more lawyers (Karabel 2010 
Fig. 11). If the incomes of the top earners in this system are viewed as being 
substantially rents extracted from the capital share (a potentially controversial 
assumption), we may have a partial explanation of our puzzle. In marginal product 
' h t tp : / / l ex icon . f t . com/ te rm.asp? t=Anglo Saxon-cap i ta l i sm 
terms there should have been a shift f rom labour to capital everywhere , but in the 
Engl ish-speaking countries a large part of this income has been captured by highly paid 
managers , f inanciers and lawyers. 
One way of measuring the magni tude of this effect is with a bot tom 99% wage 
share, as is done by Glyn (2009) for the United States. Subtract ing the top 1% of wage 
incomes f rom the wage share gives a more accurate picture of the share of the mass of 
the workforce in the national product. One would ideally write (omitt ing country and 
t ime subscripts) the bot tom 99% wage share as 
.vf = . s - , ( l - / o / 7 l J , (A.8) 
where top\i is the top 1% share of labour incomes and SL is the wage share. For 
example , if the wage share is 60% of GDP, and the top 1% of earners have a 10% share 
of wage incomes, then the bot tom 99% wage share is 0.6( 1 -0.1), or 54%. 
Unfortunately, data on t o p i i is not available for all countries in our sample. A 
more widely available statistic is the top 1% share in total personal income (toply), 
which is taken f rom Leigh (2007). Using this, we construct a proxy 
s l ' * = Si^-c . top\y (A.9) 
where c is a constant chosen so that the arithmetic mean of c.top\y is equal to the 
arithmetic mean of (i.e. s^^* = .vf in means) for the United States f rom 1970-
2004, where both measures are available (sec appendix for top\i). In other words , we 
simply attribute a constant share of the lop 1% of personal incomes to labour, and use 
this as a proxy for the share of the top 1% of labour incomes in GDP, picking the 
constant so that the average value of * f rom equation (A.9) is equal to the average 
value of the more accurate (A.8) for the US. The value of this constant , c, is 
approximately 0.46. 
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Figure A.4: Top 1% wage shares estimated from top personal and labour incomes data. 
To check that this proxy is reasonably robust, we compare c.top\y with the values 
of for the other countries where it is available. For Japan, Moriguchi (2008: 
Table 2) gives top\L. For France, Piketty (2003: Figure 3) shows that t op l i has been 
around 6% since the 1970s. Figure A.4 shows that the differences between c.top\y and 
Si^.top\, (and hence between s'^ ^ * and s'^ ) for each country are small compared to the 
differences between countries using either measure. The correlation between the two 
measures is 0.96 based on 97 observations. 
It might be objected that this is a purely mechanical exercise. Since wage shares 
have fallen the least where wage inequality has risen the most, subtracting any proxy for 
wage inequality from the wage share can hardly help but reduce the differences between 
countries in how the wage share has changed. 
In answer to this objection, two points may be made. Firstly, the measure used 
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Figure A.5: Changes in wage inequality and bottom 99% wage shares, 1980-2000. 
here for wage inequality only goes up to the 90th percentile of earnings, while the 
correction to the wage share uses the 99th and above. Empirically, wage incomes above 
the 99th percentile have behaved very differently from those between the 9()th and 95th 
and even the 95th-99th percentiles (Piketty and Saez 2007:159,162). Theoretically, it 
seems unlikely that the rent-seeking argument proposed above would apply as strongly 
at the 90th percentile. Secondly, the argument is not just qualitative but quantitative: 
even if the correction is likely to go in the 'right' way by construction, there is still the 
question of whether the magnitude of the correction is enough to eliminate the pattern 
shown in Figure A.3. 
The answer to this question appears to be 'no'. A more systematic treatment is 
given in the next chapter, but for now note that the subtraction of the top 1 % of incomes 
from the wage share can explain at most 5 percentage points of the difference between 
the United States and France or Japan. This is shown visually in Figure A.5 where. 
Table A.3: Changes in wage inequality and wage shares, rank correlations. 
(1) Bottom 99% wage share (2) Full wage share 
Period 1980-2000 1980-2000 
Keiidall 's tau-a 0.72** 0.62* 
(p=0.04) (p=0.07) 
Observations 7 7 
Column ( I ) uses the bottom 99% wage share, column (2) the full wage share for the same sample. 
The bottom 99% wage share ends in 1998 for France, and 1999 for the Netherlands. 
although the absolute differences between countries in changes in the bottom 99% wage 
share are smaller than for the full wage share, the correlation with changes in wage 
inequality is just as strong. (Note that the country labels are for the bottom 99% wage 
share - the corresponding observation for the full wage share will have the same value of 
the 9/1 decile ratio i.e. be vertically above or below.) Indeed, when we calculate the 
rank correlation between the changes in this bottom 99% wage share and wage 
inequality. Table A.3 shows that it is actually slightly higher (and more significant, 
although a sample of 7 is really too small to appeal to asymptotics) than the correlation 
using the full wage share, when this is calculated using the same restricted sample. 
To recap, we have considered many possible determinants of wage inequality and 
wage shares, and the extent to which they would predict a correlation between higher 
wage shares and higher wage inequality. The most popular explanations -
globalisation, technology, and institutions - do not seem particularly promising in this 
regard. Of the remainder, capital accumulation and the behaviour of top labour incomes 
promise at least a theoretically consistent explanation. Their empirical relevance 
remains to be considered. 
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CHAPTER A4. PANEL REGRESSIONS 
We have considered a large number of factors which potentially affect wage inequality 
and wage shares, but what is their empirical significance? To explore this question, 
panel regressions are conducted with both the wage share and wage inequality as 
dependent variables. The aim is to find whether a combination of variables f rom 
Chapter A3 can provide a theoretically plausible accounting explanation of the pattern 
in Figure A.3: that wage inequality has risen the most in those countries where wage 
shares have fallen the least. ^ 
It is evident that any variable which is practically significant in both regressions, 
but with opposite signs (i.e. which predicts that wage inequality should be higher when 
the wage share is lower, and vice-versa) cannot be part of such an explanation. We are 
therefore searching for variables which have the same sign in both regressions, or 
alternatively, variables which are significant in one regression, but not both. For 
example, a higher capital-labour ratio may be correlated with higher wage shares and 
higher inequality. Or, education might be an important determinant of wage inequality 
but have a negligible effect on the wage share. Of course, having variables with the 
right signs is a necessary, but not sufficient condition. The size of the coefficients and 
the amount of variation in the explanatory variables must also be of sufficient 
magnitude to explain a significant fraction of the puzzle. 
Two measures are employed to test this overall sufficiency. Firstly, the seemingly 
' T h e results should be seen as ana lagous to a g rowth accoun t ing or inequal i ty decompos i t i on exerc ise , 
not as an a t tempt to ident i fy the e x o g e n o u s ' d eep de te rminan t s ' of each variable . N o a t tempt is m a d e to 
a d v a n c e beyond the exis t ing l i terature in es t imat ion t echn ique or identiTication s trategy. T h e s tudies 
listed be low in Tab le A.4 rely a lmost entirely on O L S . 
unrelated regression framework is used to test for correlation between the residuals in 
the wage inequality and wage share regressions. A positive correlation would be an 
indication that, even after all of the explanatory variables are accounted for, wage 
inequality is still unexpectedly high when the wage share is unexpectedly high. 
Conversely, a lack of correlation between the residuals would indicate that there is no 
systematic relationship between the unexplained components of wage shares and wage 
inequality, i.e. that the set of explanatory variables is capable of providing a solution to 
our puzzle. Secondly, the residual changes in each variable between 1980 and 20()() are 
compared with the raw changes f rom Figures A.3 and A.4, to test more directly how 
well the estimated models can account for the pattern we are trying to explain. This 
measure has the advantage of using the absolute size of the residuals, as well as the 
strength of the correlation between them. These exercises are performed using both the 
full and bottom 99% wage shares as dependent variables, and with a variety of alternate 
specifications. 
Variable Selection 
Selection of variables is a difficult task, given the number of competing 
explanations and the large set of potential proxies for each. Tables A.4.a and .b 
summarise recent studies which employ panel regression at the country level to explain 
wage inequality and wage shares respectively. The literature is quite small, particularly 
regarding wage inequality, and there is not much of a consensus on the appropriate 
variables or the sign of their effects, let alone their size. 
Variables were selected on the basis of a convincing theoretical rationale, 
empirical support f rom the listed studies, and data availability. The included variables 
were collective bargaining coverage, the capital-labour ratio, the fraction of the working 
Table A.4.a: Summary of wage inequality panel regression literature. 
Burn iaux , Padr ini & Brandt 
(2006) 
Checch i & Garc ia 
(2005) 
Checch i & Garc ia 
(2008) 
Oulpii i g a p 
U n e m p l o y m e n t benef i t 
Union densi ty 
M i n i m u m wage 
T a x wedge 
K/L 
Othe r 
0 
0 
0 
Educa t ion (0), Outpu t gap (-) 
Social expend i tu re (-) 
L a b o u r market spend ing (0) 
U B . E P L (0) 
W a g e coord ina t ion (0) 
Table A.4.b: Summary of wage share panel regression literature. 
Bentoi l ia & Checchi Checch i & D a u d e y & Ellis & Gusc ina J aumot t e & 
St Paul & Garc ia Decreuse Smi th (2006) Tytel l 
(2003) Garc ia 
(2005) 
(2008) (2006) (2007) (2008) 
Oil pr ice 0 - 0 
R E R - -
T r a d e / G D P 0 -
E P L - 0 0 
P M R 0 0 
U B +/0 + -
Union 0 0 + 0 
densi ty 
Min. wage 0 0 
Tax wedge 0 -
K/L + 0 
K/Y - -
Educa t ion - + 
Labour U B . E P L (-) U n e m p l G D P Y/L (0) O f f s h o r i n g 
conf i ic t (-/O) W a g e -oymen t . g rowth (-) (-) 
Other E m p l o y m e n t 
g rowth (-) 
> F P (-) 
coord . (0) rate (-) t . E P L (+) 
t . P M R (-) 
Immigra t ion 
(-) 
I C T K (-) 
All regress ions use year and country Tixed e f fec t s , except Ellis & Smi th w h o use a t ime t rend, and 
Gusc ina w h o uses first d i f f e rences , instead of year FE. 
+, -, 0 indicate statistically s igni f icant posi t ive and negat ive , and statist ically ins igni f icant results . /O 
indicates s ign i f icance at 10% but not 5 % level. 
R E R ^ r e a l exchange rate, E P L = e m p l o y m e n t protec t ion legislat ion, P M R = p r o d u c t marke t regula t ion, 
U B = u n e m p l o y m e n t benef i t , TFP=to ta l fac tor product ivi ty , I C T ^ i n f o r m a t i o n & c o m m u n i c a t i o n 
technology . 
Educat ion is measured by Burnaix et al and Checch i & Garc ia as years of educa t ion , D a u d e y & D e c r e u s e 
as % of w o r k f o r c e with a tertiary educat ion . 
Ellis & S m i t h ' s t r a d e / G D P var iable only inc ludes t rade with deve lop ing count r ies . 
Jaumot te & Tytell use impor t and export pr ices separate ly instead of the real e x c h a n g e rate. 
Harr ison (2002) and Jayadev (2007) were not inc luded because they used a m u c h larger sa tnple cons is t ing 
main ly of deve lop ing count r ies , as well as a d i f fe ren t set of exp lana to ry var iables . 
age population with a tertiary education, G D P growth, and the real exchange rate. 
More detail on variable definitions, data sources, robustness checks etc. is given in the 
Data Appendix following Chapter A5. 
Dealing first with some of the obvious variables that were not included, 
technology is not directly measured, both because of the lack of consensus in Tables 
A.4.a and .b as to how it is best measured, and also because of the complications 
regarding labour- and capital-specific change discussed in the previous chapter. Any 
technological developments that are common across countries (as in the simplest 
version of the globalisation story) should be controlled for by the year fixed effects. 
Product market regulation is insignificant in all three wage share studies where it 
is used. As for other measures of product market competition, Przybyla and Roma 
(2005:5-6) conclude that 'amongst the proxies used mark-up, measured as the inverse of 
the labour income share, performs best. ' This is rather unhelpful when one is seeking to 
explain the wage share! 
The capital-output ratio is linked to too many different explanations to be 
informative: 'as long as labor is paid its marginal product, there should be a one-for-one 
relationship between the labor share and the capital-output ratio . . . Any change in the 
labor share which shows up as a deviation from that relationship must arise f rom a shift 
in labor demand which is not due to real wages, capital accumulation, or labor-
augmenting technical progress ' (Bentoilia & St Paul 2003). 
Also not included is any indication of the sectoral makeup of each economy. 
Azmat, Manning and van Reenen (2007) show that privatization has reduced the wage 
share in network industries, but admit that this is only a small part of the total change, 
speculating that the shift out of manufacturing may be important. Empirically, 
however. Lawless and Whelan (2007) and Glyn (2009) have found that the fall in the 
wage share is largely a within sector phenomenon, rather than being driven by 
composit ion effects. And theoretically, like the capital-output ratio, changes in sectoral 
composit ion could be the result of too many different forces to be really informative. A 
decline in labour intensive manufacturing, for example, could equally well be the result 
of competition f rom lower wage countries, or technological progress. 
Turning now to the included variables, the real exchange rate (2005=1, where a 
higher value indicates appreciation) is used to measure the effects of globalisation. If 
developed country exports are relatively intensive in capital and/or skilled labour 
compared to imports, a real appreciation would tend to increase wage inequality and/or 
decrease the wage share. This measure of the relative price of imports and exports is 
used in preference to a measure of quantity such as trade/GDP, since this variable was 
insignificant in Ellis and Smith (2007) when the real exchange rate is included as a 
control. Trade also gets very little support in Gordon and Dew-Becker ' s (2008) and 
Machin ' s (2008) surveys of the wage inequality literature. Immigration was not 
considered, since its effects should be adequately captured by the capital-labour ratio 
and the level of education. 
Institutions were measured by collective bargaining coverage as a fraction of the 
workforce, the only variable in this paper that does not appear in Tables A.4.a and .b. 
As argued by Booth (1995:5) and Checchi and Visser (2009), this variable gives a better 
indication of the strength of the institutional wage floor than union membership. In 
countries such as Australia and France, collectively bargained wages and conditions 
cover a majority of the workforce despite low union membership As well as being 
included in levels, coverage is also interacted with a time trend, to capture the 
possibility that a common shock might affect countries differently depending on their 
institutions. Our theoretical priors would indicate that stronger institutions should be 
correlated with lower wage inequality and a higher wage share. The minimum wage is 
another potential measure, but it was not available for several of the countries in our 
already small sample, as well as being highly correlated with the coverage variable. It 
is, however, used in an alternate specification later in this chapter. Unemployment 
benefits were not used since the empirical results in table 4.A are inconsistent, and they 
have received less attention in the literature generally. 
Education is measured by the fraction of the population aged 25-64 with a tertiary 
education i.e. the relative supply of skilled labour. Again, our prior is for education to 
lower wage inequality, and possibly increase the wage share. 
Capital accumulation is measured by the capital-labour ratio. Theoretically, when 
used as an explanatory variable for the wage share, it should be adjusted for 
productivity. However, given that separate estimates for capital- and labour-
augmenting productivity are not generally available and are very complicated to 
calculate (e.g. Ripatti and Vilmunen 2001), the only practical course would be to 
assume some common trend in productivity growth for all countries, as is done in 
Kehoe and Prescott (2001). And this is redundant as long as the regression uses time 
controls: if we deflate the capital-labour ratio k (omitting time and country subscripts) 
by a time factor exp(at) (where a is the growth rate of the appropriate productivity 
variable) and then take the natural log, we are left with ln(k)-at. The second term would 
clearly be swept out by a linear time trend, let alone year flxed effects. According to 
our theory, capital accumulation should cause higher wage inequality and a higher wage 
share. 
Top labour incomes are controlled for using the bottom 99% wage share 
calculated in the previous chapter. (Strictly speaking, this is a modification to the 
dependent variable, not an explanatory variable per se.) 
Table A.5: Descriptive statistics for regression data. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
d91 290 2.93 0.64 1.95 4.86 
Share 290 61.3 5.16 45.0 76.4 
Top i 205 3.52 1.24 1.65 7.6 
Coverage 290 0.63 0.27 0.13 0.97 
Education 290 0.21 0.06 0.07 0.39 
RER 290 1.03 0.14 0.73 1.52 
ln(K/L) 290 11.9 0.26 11.2 12.4 
GDP growth 290 0.025 0.019 -0.067 0.070 
cl91 = 9/1 earnings decile ratio, Share = wage share. Topi = t o p i y RER = real exchange rate 
Finally, GDP growth is included as a cyclical control: it is generally accepted that 
the wage share is anticyclical, so growth should enter with a negative sign. 
The descriptive statistics are given below in Table A.5. These are for the 
observations used in the regressions only, and do not include the inequality and share 
data for Korea used in chapter A2, or data for other countries in years where some of the 
variables are not available. It does, however, include some observations generated by 
linear inteipolation (see the Data Appendix). 
The correlation matrix is given in Table A.6. Of note are the strong negative 
correlations between collective bargaining coverage (coverage) and wage inequality 
(d91), and between education and the wage share. The first is in accord with our priors, 
but the second is very surprising. Within the explanatory variables, the (log) capital-
labour ratio is strongly positively correlated with education. Finally, it is interesting to 
note that wage shares and wage inequality are positively correlated even in levels, 
although weakly. 
Table A.6: Correlation matrix for regression data. 
d91 Share Coverage Education REER ln(K/L) 
d91 1 
Share 0.24 1 
Coverage -0.65 -0.26 1 
Education 0.11 -0.53 -0.34 1 
RER -0.10 0.31 0.05 -0.15 1 
ln(K/L) 0.23 -0.19 -0.04 0.58 0.02 1 
GDP growth 0.14 -0.11 -0.09 0.05 -0.18 0.03 
Baseline Results 
W c now turn to the regressions themselves. As emphasised above, because of potential 
issues with data quality and endogeneity, these should be seen as a cautious account ing 
exercise: how much of the historical variation in wage inequality and wage shares can 
be accounted for by variables that have been theoretically and empirically identified as 
potential explanators? The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) est imator is used, 
with year and country fixed effects to sweep out unobserved c o m m o n shocks and 
heterogeneity between countries. The results for the full sample of 290 observat ions are 
shown below in Table A.7.a. 
In column (1), we first estimate a model with year and country fixed effects as 
the only explanatory variables. This provides a baseline for the residual correlation, in a 
way that will become clearer below. For now, simply note the reasonably high and 
strongly significant positive correlation between the residuals, indicating that wage 
inequality tends to be high when wage shares are high (after accounting for changes that 
affect all countries in a given year, and unchanging country level effects) . 
Column (2) shows the model with the full set of explanatory variables. At first 
glance these variables seem to do a good job of reducing the residual correlation, which 
falls f rom 0.46 to 0.10, and is only marginally significant. Perhaps, then, the mystery is 
no longer a mystery. But looking more closely at the regression coeff icients , we find 
that we have replaced one my.stery by another. For wage inequality, we find that 
education, and the interaction of collective bargaining coverage with time, are both 
negative and significant. This is in accord with our priors. Bui turning to the wage 
share, we find that, al though it is countercyclical as expected, it has a s ignif icant 
negative correlation with both collective bargaining and educat ion! Educat ion seems 
particularly important since it is significant with the same sign in both equations, one of 
Table A.7.a: Seemingly Unrelated Regression, 1975-2007. 
D e p e n d e n t ( 1 ) F E only (2 ) Full model (3) - Educa t ion 
var iable : d91 Share d91 Share d 9 l 
Share 
C o v e r a g e -0 .018 -3 .35** -0 .025 
- 3 . 4 3 * 
(0 .16) (2 .12) (0 .16) (1 .77) 
Cove rage . t ime - 0 . 0 2 5 2 * * * -0 .046 - 0 . 0 2 7 7 * * * -0 .078 
(8.17) (1 .15) (6 .19) (1 .38) 
Educa t ion -6 .24**" - 6 2 . 4 * * * 
(18.0) (12.1) 
R E R -0 .018 -0 .42 -0 .052 
0 .27 
(0.31) (0 .50) (0 .63) (0 .26) 
ln (K/L) -0 .19 1.8 -0 .740*** -3 .67* 
(1.61) (1 .03) (4 .45) ( 1 . / / ) 
G D P growth 0 .53 -44 .3*** 1.38** - 3 5 . 8 * * * 
(1 .37) (7 .76) (2 .48) (5 .15) 
Obse rva t ions 2 9 0 2 9 0 2 9 0 
Count r i e s 10 10 10 
Residual 0 .46*** 0 .10* 0 . 4 8 * * * 
corre la t ion (p^O.OO) (p==0.08) (p=0 .00) 
All regress ions include country & year f ixed e f fec t s . 
*** /** /* indicate s igni f icance at 1 /5/10% level us ing a two- ta i led lest. 
Bracke ts contain z-stat ist ics for regression coef f ic ien t s , and p-va lues for Breusch -Pagan tests of res idual 
corre la t ion. 
the necessary conditions identified above. Yet by what plausible mechanism would an 
increase in the proportion of the population with a tertiary education reduce the wage 
share? If we drop this variable, however, as is done in column (3), all the other 
variables put together do nothing to reduce the residual correlation. In fact, at 0.48, it is 
slightly higher than in the model with no fixed effects! 
While suggestive, the residual correlation is not a perfect measure of the puzzle 
we are trying to explain. It says nothing about the size of the residuals relative to the 
raw changes in wage inequality and wage shares. Furthermore, there is a theoretical 
possibility that the residual correlation could be extremely strong at the annual 
frequency used to estimate the regressions, but nonexistent over longer periods 
(although this is the reverse of what we would expect given the results in Table A.2). 
To deal with these issues, we create a regression version of Figure A.3 based on 
the changes in the residuals from the estimated equations. Note that we can always 
express any observed value of wage inequality or the wage share for a given country 
and year ( ) as the sum of the value predicted by a particular model (y , , ) and the 
residual f rom that model ( » „ ) i.e. 
y, = y,, + • 
Therefore, omitting time subscripts, we can write the change from any year / = 7 to any 
other year / = 7 + 5 as 
Ay, = Ay, + Ai?,. (A. 10) 
Now, suppose that the model in question is the fixed effects only model from column 
(1) of Table A.7.a i.e. 
}'., = + d,, 
where <7, is the estimated country FE and cl, the estimated year FE. Then 
Ay, - M 
and, using (A. 10), 
Ari,=Ay.-Ad. (A. 11) 
The change in the residual is simply the change in the dependent variable minus the 
change in the year fixed effect, which does not vary across countries. In other words, 
by plotting the change in the residual f rom the FE only model, we are effectively 
recreating Figure A.3, except that both scales have been remeaned. Figure A.6 is indeed 
identical except for this change in scale and the omission of Korea. 
With the FE model as a baseline, we then perform the same exercise using the 
models f rom columns (2) and (3) of Table A.7.a, which allows the predicted value y„ 
to contain a richer set of explanatory variables. When these are superimposed on Figure 
A.6, two results stand out immediately. Firstly, the residual changes are compressed 
more (relative to the FE only model) in the horizontal axis, indicating that both models 
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Figure A.6: Residual changes in wage inequaHty and the wage share, 1980-2000. 
are belter at explaining the changes in wage inequality than the changes in the wage 
share. Secondly, the education variable is absolutely crucial to the performance of the 
model, as shown by the much greater spread in the residual changes when it is dropped. 
As well as this visual comparison, we calculate an R^-like measure of the 
fraction of variance in the residual changes explained by the different models. Since, 
for a given T and 5, equation (A. 11) implies that Vfl/-(A;/,) = VcuiAy^) for the FE only 
model, we may write 
= 1 -
VariAu,) 
(A. 12) 
Var{Ay,) 
for whichever model and dependent variable we are interested in. (This will equal zero 
for the FE only model.) Table A.7.b shows these values calculated for the period 1980-
2000 (i.e. T=1980 and 5=20) for both wage inequality and wage shares, with and 
without education as an explanatory variable. Also given is the rank correlation 
Table A.7.b: Residual changes, 1980-2000. 
M o d e l ( I ) F E only 
Rank corre la t ion 0 .67** 
(p=0 .02 ) 
R ; ( d 9 1 ) 0 
R" (share) 0 
Qb.servat ions 9 
N Z not inc luded s ince da ta on ly lor 1986-. 
(2) Full model (3) - Educa t ion 
-0 .06 0 . 5 6 * * 
(p=0 .92) ( p = 0 . 0 5 ) 
0 . 8 9 0 . 3 6 
0 .46 -0 .08 
9 9 
between the residual changes in wage inequality and the wage share, as is done in Table 
A.l for the raw changes. Where the R^ measures the success of the models in 
explaining the changes over time in each variable individually, the rank correlation 
measures the success of the models in explaining the correlation between the changes in 
the two variables. (For example, if the R^'s were high and the rank correlations were 
also high, this would imply that the models explained most of the change in each 
variable, but that the residual changes were still highly correlated.) 
These results confirm the visual impression from Figure A.6. When the 
education variable is included, the model can explain nearly 90% of the variance of the 
changes in wage inequality, and nearly half of the variance of the changes in the wage 
share. Furthermore, the positive correlation between the changes completely disappears 
- our puzzle has been 'explained'. Yet when we drop education from the model, it can 
explain little more than a third of the variance in the changes in wage inequality, none 
of the variance of the changes in the wage share,^ and the correlation of the residual 
changes is nearly as strong as in the FE only model (i.e. in the raw inequality/shares 
data). 
We now repeat these exerci.ses with the bottom 99% wage share (share99) 
replacing the wage share. The notable differences in Table A.8.a compared to A.7.a are 
that the capital-labour ratio is now significant and negative in both regressions, and the 
' T h e f ract ion of var iance exp la ined can be negat ive , un l ike the R ' for an O L S regress ion , b e c a u s e the 
model used to genera te the residual c h a n g e s AQ; is not fit to m a x i m i s e (A. 12). 
Table A.8.a: SUR, bottom 99% wage share. 
Dependent ( l ) F E o n l y (2) Full model (3) - Education 
variable: d91 Share d91 Share99 d91 Share99 
Coverage -0.051 1.77 0.163 2.91 
(0.40) (0.98) (1.09) (1.59) 
Coverage.time -0.0319*** -0.153** -0.0404*** -0.0199*** 
(7.36) (2.47) (7.87) (3.17) 
Education -5.87*** 
(9.71) (3.64) 
RER -0.046 0.21 -0.061 0.13 
(0.68) (0.22) (0.76) (0.13) 
ln(K/L) -0.0434** -8.97*** -1.23*** 2*** 
(2.53) (3.66) (6.77) (5.97) 
GDP growth 0.25 -42.0*** 1.23** -36.8*** 
(0.52) (6.23) (2.21) (5.41) 
Observations 205 205 205 
Countries 8 8 8 
Residual 0.26*** 0.09 0.21*** 
correlation (p=().00) (p=O.I8) (p=0.00) 
residual correlation is somewhat lower. Also, the negative correlation of collective 
bargaining with the wage share now shows up through the level rather than the time 
interaction. Otherwise, the results are very similar, particularly with regards to the 
effect of the education variable. 
Turning now to the residual changes, we see that the basic pattern of Table A.7.b 
is repeated in Table A.8.b, except that the rank correlation of the residual changes does 
not increase when education is dropped form the model. However, this is not because 
the model without education is performing better in this case. Rather, it is because it is 
doing such an abysmal job of explaining the bottom 99% wage share (as shown by the 
strongly negative R^). 
Table A.8.b: Residual changes 1980-2000, bottom 99% wage share. 
Model (1) FE only (2) Full model (3) - Education 
Rank correlation 0.81** 0.14 0.14 
p-value 0.02 0.76 0.76 
R ^ ( d 9 l ) . 0 0.85 0.57 
R^ (share99) 0 -0.16 -0.55 
Observations 7 7 7 
Changes for France and the Netherlands are from 1980-98 and 1980-99 respectively. 
Table A .9.a: SUR, restricted sample. 
Dependen t ( 1 ) F E only (2) Full model (3) - Educat ion 
variable; d91 Share d 9 l Share d 9 l Share 
Coverage -0.051 0 .69 0 .163 2.51 
(0.40) (0 .37) (1 .09) (1 .29) 
Coverage . t ime -0 .0319* ** -0 .269*** - 0 . 0 4 0 4 * * * -0 .341** 
(7.36) (4.24) (7 .87) (5 .11) 
Educat ion -5 .87*** -50 .1*** 
(9.71) (5 .67) 
R E R -0 .046 -0 .012 -0 .061 -1 .29 
(0.68) (1 .19) (0 .76) (1 .23) 
ln(K/L) -0 .434** -7 .13*** -1 .23*** -13 .9*** 
(2.53) (2 .84) (6 .77) (5 .89) 
G D P growth 0 .25 -40 .6*** 1.23** - 3 2 . 2 * * * 
(0.52) (5.87) (2 .21) (4 .43) 
Observa t ions 205 205 205 
Count r ies 8 8 8 
Residual 0 .46*** 0 .18*** 0 .35*** 
correlat ion (p=0.00) (p=0 .01) (0 .00) 
Since the bottom 99% wage share is estimated on a more restricted sample of 
205 observations, we must check if these differences are a result of the adjustment to the 
wage share or just the smaller sample. Therefore, we repeat the analysis again using the 
full wage share on the restricted sample. The results are shown in Tables A.9.a & b. 
The residual correlation is similar to Table A.7.a (the full sample) in column (I) , 
higher in (2) and lower in (3). Compared to the values in Table A.8.a where the bottom 
99% wage share was used, the correlations are higher across the board. In this sense 
one may say that the adjustment goes some way towards explaining the puzzle. The 
significance of the capital-labour ratio seems to be an artefact of the restricted sample, 
rather than the adjustment to the wage share, as does the shift in significance from the 
level of collective bargaining to the time interaction. The residual changes below are 
fairly similar to those in the full sample, although the rank correlation in (I) is slightly 
higher, again indicating that the change in the sample rather than the adjustment to the 
wage share is the cause. 
Table A.9.b: Residual changes, 1980-2000, restricted sample. 
M o d e l ( l ) F E o n l y (2) Full model (3) - Educa t i on" 
R a n k corre la t ion 0 .81** 0 1 4 0 ^ 2 
p-va lue 0 .02 0 .76 0 . 1 3 
R ' ( d 9 1 ) 0 0 .85 0 .57 
R ' ( s h a r e ) 0 0 .44 0 .13 
O b s e r v a t i o n s 7 7 7 
Taking the results as a whole, it is clear that we have much better explanations 
for changes in wage inequality than for changes in the wage share. This is true both 
statistically (in the b tables, the R-squareds for the residual changes are much higher for 
wage inequality than for the wage share) and in terms of economic intuition. It makes 
perfect sense that a greater supply of educated labour, and stronger labour market 
institutions, should act to contain rises in wage inequality (although it is interesting that 
the effect of bargaining works through the time interaction, indicating that it is not the 
weakening of institutions per se that drives rising wage inequality, but rather than 
stronger institutions tend to check what would otherwise be a rise in inequality over 
time). It makes much less sense that the same factors should result in a lower wage 
share. If we were willing to accept these as causal relationships, we might indeed say 
that we had an explanation for our puzzle, since the residual correlation, both in levels 
and changes, becomes much smaller and less significant in our full models when 
compared with the FE only baseline. Yet if we reject the correlation as spurious and 
economically implausible, we are left with little explanatory power over the wage share, 
except the fact that it is anticyclical (which is of limited use in explaining long run 
trends). The use of the bottom 99% wage share marginally reduces the correlation in 
the level of the residuals, but does not have the same effect on the residual changes, 
which are the closest measure of our puzzle. 
Finally, we consider some further variations on the specifications, including a 
parsimonious model with robust, clustered standard errors, a growth-style regression 
using 5 year averages in first differences and levels, and alternative measures of 
education and labour market institutions. While some of the results using 5 year 
averages are weaker (as might be expected given the results in Table A.2), none of these 
analyses challenge the main points listed above. Indeed, the alternative education 
measure compounds the mystery by being insignificant with respect to both wage 
inequality and shares. 
Alternative specifications 
We now consider some alternative specifications to the SUR used above. Table 11.8 
shows equations estimated on the same data by OLS with robust, clustered standard 
errors, which are used to create a parsimonious version of each equation. We see that 
these results are practically the same as those above, both in terms of which variables 
are significant, and the residual changes of the various models. (Because we estimate 
each equation individually rather than using SUR, we do not have results for the 
Breusch-Pagan test of residual correlation.) All specifications use the same time 
periods as above, data permitting (see Appendix Table 1 at the end of the Data 
Appendix). 
Table A.lO.a: Parsimonious regressions with robust standard errors. 
Dependent ( 1 ) F E only (2) Parsimonious model (3 ) - - Education 
variable: d91 Share d91 Share d91 Share 
Coverage 
Coverage.time -0.0234*** -0.0131* -0.0213 -0.12 
(3.97) (1.93) (1.34) (0.70) 
Education -6.53*** 
(12.53) 
-61.7*** 
(4.84) 
RER 
In(KyL) 
GDP growth -42.6*** 
(4.95) 
-30.3** 
(2.35) 
Observations 290 290 290 
Countries 10 10 10 
Robust t-statistics clustered by country. Significance levels based on 9 degrees of freedom (# clusters • 
1). F-tests for exclusions in parsimonious model have p-values 0.5 I, 0.79 for d9l and share respectively. 
Table A.lO.b: Residual changes, 1980-2000, parsimonious model. 
Model ( 1 ) F E only (2) Parsimoniou.s model (3) - Education 
Rank correlation 0.67** -0.22 0.28 
(p=0.02) (p=0.47) (p -0 .35) 
R" inequality 0 0.90 0.14 
R" share 0 0.42 -0.02 
Observations 9 9 9 
Next, we take a very different approach, taking 5 year averages of the data and 
running an SUR on their first differences, along with the levels of each dependent 
variable (to capture any reversion to the mean) and collective bargaining (to correspond 
to the time interaction in the previous models). 
Again, the main conclusions are unchanged. The residual correlation, however, is 
low even in the FE only model, as can be seen in Table A. 11. (The residual changes are 
not meaningful here because the dependent variables are in first differences, not levels.) 
The level of both dependent variables is statistically insignificant, indicating that 
disequilibrium effects do not seem to be important. 
Table A . l l : SUR with first differences, 5 year averages. 
Dependent (1) FE only (2) Full model (3) - Education 
variable: d9l Share d9l Share d91 Share 
Dep. var. -0.24 -0.100 -0.006 -0.121* 
(level) (0.92) (1.45) (0.19) (1.82) 
Coverage -0.34 -1.5 -0.480* -1.9 
(1.49) (0.38) (1.74) (0.47) 
Coverage -0.189*** -0.58 -0.137* -0.55 
(level) (2.77) (0.58) (1.67) (0.54) 
Education -5.88*** -33.5 
(4.13) (1.60) 
Real exchange 0.040 0.2 1.2 0.5 
(0.29) (0.07) (0.73) (0.23) 
ln(K/L) -0.12 2.6 -0.34 1.9 
(0.33) (0.44) (0.81) (0.32) 
GDP growth 0.74 -58.1*** 0.81 -57.0 
(0.73) (0.00) (0.65) (3.34) 
Observations 44 44 
Countries 10 10 
Residual 0.18 0.08 0.14 
correlation (p=0.23) (p=0.60) (p -0 .36) 
Finally, we consider al temative measures of educational attainment and labour 
market institutions. Given the suiprising correlation of the IIASA measure of higher 
education with lower wage shares, it seems desirable to check the robustness of this 
result by using an alternate data source f rom Barro and Lee (2000). The interpretation 
of this variable is exactly the same: the fraction of the working age population with at 
least some tertiary education. For the 260 observations where both series are available, 
the conela t ion is 0.69, indicating that, while the series are not wildly divergent, there is 
certainly room for different results. The correlation with the level of the wage share is -
0.50 (249 observations), which is similar to the -0.53 for the original measure. 
However, as shown in Table A. 12, the BaiTO & Lee education variable is not 
significantly conela ted with either wage inequality or the wage share once the other 
explanatory variables and fixed effects are added. This is certainly reassuring in terms 
of the wage share, but disappointing with regards to wage inequality (since it seems 
perfectly reasonable that a greater supply of educated labour should reduce wage 
inequality). By way of compensat ion, the capital-labour ratio becomes significantly 
negative in both regressions (contradicting the theory proposed in chapter A3!). It is 
also notable that the residual conela t ion remains very high and significant, indicating a 
large unexplained component to the correlation between higher wage inequality and 
higher wage shares. Since the Barro & Lee measure is only available up to the year 
2000, restricting the size of the sample to 235 observations, we also run the regression 
with the IIASA education measure on the same sample. Table A. 12.a conf i rms that the 
significance of the education variable and the overall explanatory power of the model 
depends on the particular education measure used and not the smaller sample. The 
significance of the other variables, however , seems to be partly an artefact of the 
sample. 
Table A.12.a: SUR, Bano & Lee education measure. 
Dependent variable: { D F E only c ?) Barro & Lee (3) IIASA 
d91 Share d9 1 Share d91 Share 
Coverage 0.02 -2.1 0.01 -2.64 
(0.10) (0.76) (0.09) (1.35) 
Coveraae. t ime -0.0351 *** -0.196* -0.0325*** -0.156** 
(4.44) (1.88) (7.43) (2.39) 
Education 0.0034 0.015 -6.55*** -57.2*** 
(0.65) (0.21) (10.8) (6.34) 
RER -0.008 -0.23 -0.032 -0.39 
(0.11) (0.23) (0.52) (0.43) 
ln(K/L) -1.06*** -9.85*** -0.294* -3.03 
(6.34) (4.47) (1.95) (1.35) 
GDP growth 0.870* -44.4*** 0.32 _49 3*** 
(1.84) (7.11) (0.83) (8.50) 
Observations 235 235 235 
Countries 10 10 10 
Residual correlation 0.39*** 0.32*** 0.13** 
(p=0.00) (p=0.()0) (p=0.04) 
Table A.12.b: Residual changes, 1980-2()()0, Barro & Lee education measure. 
Model ( 1 ) F E (2) Barro & Lee (3) IIASA 
Rank correlation 0.67** 0.44 -0.17 
(p=0.02) (p=0.12) (p=0.60) 
R" inequality 0 0.33 0.87 
R ' share 0 -0.19 0.40 
Observations 9 9 9 
Finally, we perform a similar exercise by using the ratio of the minimum to the 
median wage for each country (obtained from the OECD) as an additional measure of 
labour market institutions. This restricts the sample to 173 observations from 7 
countries, hiterestingly, when it is added to the base regression, the level of the 
minimum wage has an individually significant negative effect on wage inequality even 
controlling for the interaction of collective bargaining with time, despite the very high 
conelation between the two variables. Many other variables become significant, with 
sometimes counterintuitive signs, but this seems to be an artefact of the sample rather 
than the addition of the minimum wage variable. Since the coverage-time interaction 
and minimum wage variables, along with education, are significant with the same sign 
in both regressions, it is not suiprising that Table A.13.b shows that the residual changes 
are negative and both variables are very well explained (although with only 4 countries 
represented this is of questionable value) 
Table A.13.a: SUR with minimum wage. 
D e p e n d e n t ( l ) F E o n l y (2) w/ min (3) w/o min 
var iable : d91 Share d91 Share d91 Sha re 
C o v e r a g e 0 .06 2 8 . 0 * * * - 0 . 0 0 9 8 . 5 5 * * * 
(0 .29) (10 .3) (0 .06) (3 .59) 
C o v e r a g e , t ime - 0 . 0 3 6 * * * - 0 . 9 6 9 * * * - 0 . 0 4 4 4 * * * - 0 . 3 4 0 * * * 
(6 .10) (12 .0) (13 .1 ) (6 .21) 
M i n i m u m / m e d i a n - 1 . 1 8 * * * - 3 6 . 0 * * * 
w a g e (3 .28) (7 .31) 
M i n i m u m . t i m e 0 . 0 0 0 0 8 2 12*** 
(0 .01) (9 .97) 
Educa t ion - 4 . 9 2 * * * - 3 4 . 8 * * * - 5 . 9 1 * * * - 4 6 . 5 * * * 
(11.82) (6 .14) (15 .6) (7 .78) 
R E R 0.01 0 .7 O . l l l * -1 .6 
(0 .19) (0 .82) (1 .78) (1 .56) 
in (K/L) - 0 . 4 3 * * * -0.1 - 0 . 8 8 7 * * * - 5 . 1 7 * * * 
(2 .56) (0 ,06) (6 .29) (2 .27) 
G D P g rowth - 0 . 0 0 6 - 3 3 . 7 * * * -0.1 - 3 0 . 5 * * * 
(0 .01) (0 .00) (0 .22) (4 .41) 
O b s e r v a t i o n s 172 172 
C o u n t r i e s 7 7 
Res idua l 0 . 5 2 * * * 0 .06 0 .05 
cor re la t ion ( p = 0 . 0 0 ) ( p = 0 . 4 3 ) ( p = 0 . 4 9 ) 
Table A.13.b: Residual changes, 1980-2000, with minimum wage. 
M o d e l (1) EE only (2) w/ min (3) w/o min 
Rank corre la t ion 0 . 6 7 * * - 0 . 3 3 - 0 . 6 6 
(p=0 .30 ) (p=0 .76 ) ( p = 0 . 3 1 ) 
R^ inequal i ty 0 0 . 9 7 0 . 9 9 
R^ share 0 0.71 0 . 4 3 
Obse rva t i ons 4 4 4 
CHAPTER A5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined the trends in wage inequaHty and wage shares since the 1970s 
for a sample of O E C D countries. There is a trend towards higher wage inequality in 
most countries, and lower wage shares in all. Considering these trends jointly rather 
than individually, however, brings out an underappreciated point. They are inversely 
related at a country level: wage inequality has risen most in those countries where wage 
shares have fallen least, and vice-versa. This f inding is robust to different measures of 
wage inequality and wage shares for time periods of twenty years and longer, although 
it weakens in shorter sub-periods. This is a surprising result, since the same forces, such 
as globalisation, technology, and institutions, are often blamed for both rising wage 
inequality and falling wage shares. 
Since forces that explain both trends seem unpromising to explain why the trends 
are inversely correlated, we must look for alternative explanations. This paper has 
focused on capital accumulation and top wages, presenting a new production function 
which incorporates both capital-skill complementari ty and a simple expression for the 
wage share, and calculating bottom 99% wage shares for eight O E C D countries. 
Our panel regressions, however, do not particularly support either of these 
explanations. Given issues with data quality and endogeneity, we should hesitate before 
regarding these results as definitive, but the exercise does not increase their plausibility. 
The most robust results in our data are that the time-collective bargaining interaction is 
correlated with lower wage inequality, and that wage shares are anti-cyclical. Using the 
IIASA measure of education, we also find that higher education levels are correlated 
with lower wage inequality and, surprisingly, lower wage shares, but both of these 
results disappear when the Barro and Lee measure of education is used. While 
statistically the finding with the IIASA data can 'explain ' why higher wage inequality 
and wage shares go together, it seems rather implausible that a more highly educated 
workforce should result in a lower wage share. When the education variable is 
excluded, or when the Barro and Lee measure is used, the explanatory power of our 
model over the puzzle disappears. The great unknown is the behaviour of the wage 
share: the model results for wage inequality are both empirically and theoretically more 
convincing and complete. The bottom 99% wage share does not produce notably 
different results f rom the full wage share. Excluding top labour incomes certainly 
narrows the differences between countries in the behaviour of the wage share, but it 
does not alter the strength of the correlation with changes in wage inequality. 
In conclusion, the relationship between changes in wage inequality and changes in 
wage shares is still something of a mystery. Hopefully, however, this paper has 
succeeded in the modest aim of documenting and highlighting the existence of this 
previously ignored puzzle, and suggesting some possible lines of explanation. After all, 
given that rising wage inequality and falling wage shares have received so much 
attention as individual phenomena (the x co-ordinate of the US data point in Figure A.3 
must have inspired dozens if not hundreds of papers), the fact that the two trends have 
such a strong and counter-intuitive relationship should excite considerable curiosity. 
APPENDIX: DATA DESCRIPTION 
Wage inequality Earnings deciles were obtained f rom OECD.Stat (Labour: Earnings: 
Decile Ratios of Gross Earnings) http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx, downloaded 7 July 
2009. 
Wage shares f rom A M E C O 7.6 'Adjusted Wage Share ' ( A M E C O is the Annual Macro-
ECOnomic database of the European Commission 's Directorate General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs): 
http:/ /ec.europa.eu/economv finance/db indicators/db indicators8646 en.htm, 
downloaded 7 July 2009. The preferred definition is 'Adjusted wage share: total 
economy: as percentage of G D P at current market prices (Compensation per employee 
as percentage of G D P at market prices per person employed.) ' . The alternative is to use 
factor cost rather than market prices. Both make two important corrections: the use of 
total compensation rather than just wages, and the imputation of average earnings to the 
self employed, as part of the wage share. See Gollin (2002) for a discussion of the 
issues. 
Arpaia, Perez and Pichelmann (2009) have argued that adjust ing for self 
employment at the national level is insufficient, and that this adjustment should be made 
at the industry level to avoid error f rom composit ion effects . The eiTor, however, was 
found to be largest in the Mediterranean countries (Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal) 
which are not used in this paper. 
Collective bargaining is the AdjCov variable f rom the ICTWSS (Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts) 
Database Version 2 http://www.uva-aias.net/208, downloaded 16 July 2009. In the 
original dataset it is expressed as the percentage of the eligible workforce covered by 
collective bargaining, but for our regressions it is converted to a fraction in order to 
keep the number of decimal places in the coefficients manageable. 
This variable has a correlation of 0.97 with the union coverage variable uc f rom 
the CEP-OECD data set described in Nickell (2006), based on the 240 observations 
which overlap with the ICTWSS measure. It also has a correlation of 0.83 with the 
minimum/median wage ratio f rom OECD.Stat (Labour: Earnings: Minimum relative to 
average wages of full-time workers), downloaded 7 July 2009, based on the 182 
observations which overlap (observations for New Zealand from 1979-85 inclusive 
were deleted because of a large, anomalous dip). The ICTWSS variable was preferred 
over these others as having the largest coverage. 
Capital-labour ratio. The capital stock was estimated using population, GDP/capita 
and investment/GDP (at constant prices) f rom Penn World Table 6.3, downloaded 16 
October 2009 from http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php site/pwt63/pwt63 form.php. 
Following King & Levine (1994), an initial capital stock was calculated under the 
assumption of a steady state in which K = I/(gY+d), where K is the capital stock, I is 
investment, gy is the growth rate of G D P ()0, and d is the depreciation rate. This 
expression is divided by Y to obtain an expression for the steady state capital/output 
ratio. This expression is evaluated using the arithmetic mean of I/Y f rom 1950-60. gy is 
calculated according to an arithmetic mean weighted 1/4 to the country and period in 
question, 3/4 to a world average of 4% per annum (e.g. if a certain country grew at 8% 
p.a. from 1950-60, the value of gY used would be 0.25(8) + 0.75(4) or 5%). 
Depreciation is assumed to be 1% p.a. This estimate for the capital-output ratio is used 
to seed an initial value for K m 1951 by multiplying with the arithmetic mean of Y from 
1950-52. After this, the capital stock is simply updated using the perpetual inventory 
method. The resulting estimate of the capital stock is divided by civilian employment 
from OECD.Stat (Labour: Labour Force Statistics: Annual Labour Force Statistics: 
ALPS Summary Tables, downloaded 19 August 2009) to give the capital-labour ratio. 
Real effective exchange rote from the Bank for International Settlements 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/eer/narrow0907.xls. downloaded 6 August 2009. Monthly 
figures converted to annual using the geometric mean (which matches 2005=100 better 
than the arithmetic mean). Data is divided by 100 so that 2005=1 (the same adjustment, 
for the same reasons, as applied to collective bargaining). 
GDP growth AMECO 6.1 'Gross domestic product at constant prices (OVGD)' , 
downloaded 6 August 2009. 
topXy from Leigh (2007) T o p income shares for 13 developed countries' 
http://econrsss.anu.edu.au/~aleigh/contact.htm. downloaded 23 June 2009. This is 
available for all countries used in the paper except Denmark and Finland, beginning in 
1970 and ending at various dates in the late 90s and early 2000s. topXt for United 
States from table B2 of Piketty and Saez (2007), updated at 
http://elsa.berkelev.edu/~saez/TabFig20()7.xls. downloaded 1 September 2009. 
Education The fraction of the population aged 25-64 (both sexes) with tertiary 
education was constructed using the data from Lutz, Goujon and Sanderson (2007) and 
Samir et al (2008), downloaded 13 October 2009 from 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/edu07/Education database.zip and 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/Edu07FP/Population%20Distributin%2()and%20 
Means%20Years%20of%20Schooling%20 %20Education%20Proiection%202()()0 205 
O-zip. Lutz, Goujon and Sanderson (2007) gives educational attainment at 5 year 
intervals from 1970-2000, while Samir et al (2008) projects attainment at the same 
frequency from 2005-2050 under several different scenarios (only the 2005 and 2010 
observations from the Global Education Trend or 'most likely' scenario were used). 
Linear interpolation was then used to generate annual data. This is referred to as the 
HAS A dataset. A similar procedure was applied to the data from Barro & Lee (2001) 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.htn-il downloaded 7 August 2009. The 
Barro & Lee data only covers the period -2000. 
Note on Interpolation. For the panel regressions, gaps of less than five years were filled 
by linear interpolation. 
Appendix Table 1: Summary of data availability for panel regressions. 
W a g e share 90 /10 Col lec t ive ba rga in ing M i n i m u m w a g e S h a r e 9 9 
Aust ra l ia 75- -07 85- -03 
D e n m a r k 80-90 , 96 -07 -07 N A N A 
Finland 77-07 - 0 0 N A N A 
France -05 8 0 - 0 0 75- - 9 8 
Japan 75- 80 -00 75- -02 
Ne the r l ands 77 -05 - 0 0 75- - 9 9 
N Z 86- 84- 8 0 - 0 0 75- 86 -02 
S w e d e n 75 -04 - 0 6 N A -04 
U K -07 99- - 0 0 
U S 73- -07 75- -04 
G a p s of less than 5 years were fil led with l inear in terpola t ion and not s h o w n here. 
S h a r e 9 9 = bo t tom 9 9 % w a g e share. 
T h e cap i ta l / l abour ratio, real e x c h a n g e rate, G D P and educa t ion were ava i lab le for all yea r s and all 
coun t r i e s f rom 1970-2008 . 
PARTE 
TWO NOTES ON LABOUR DEMAND 
We revisit the recent controversy over the elasticity of demand for labour that began 
with Lewis and MacDonald (2002). It uses their chosen model, that of Allen (1938), to 
show that their results are invalid for full elasticities but may have some relevance for 
constant output elasticities. It also argues that this microeconomic model, and 
elasticities derived from it, is not particularly useful in a macroeconomic context. 
The response of native wages to immigration depends on the behaviour of the capital 
stock. Much recent literature assumes that the return to capital is unaffected by 
migration in the long run, leaving average wages unchanged. This paper shows that, if 
immigration is modelled as a continuous f low rather than a one off shock, it reduces the 
average wage even in the long run. A calibration of a simple growth model with recent 
US immigration rates gives a reduction in average wages of 5%, larger than most 
estimates of its effect on relative wages. 

CHAPTER Bl: A NOTE ON THE ELASTICITY OF 
DEMAND FOR HOMOGENOUS LABOUR 
There have been many attempts to estimate a labour demand curve for the Austrahan 
economy, which have naturally spawned many econometric controversies. Recently, 
however, there has been more fundamental disagreement about the interpretation of the 
empirical results. In particular, the methods used to derive the elasticity of demand for 
labour f rom estimates of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour have 
come under attack. This chapter details Lewis and MacDonald ' s (2002) case that the 
usual procedure is incorrect, since it confuses nominal and real wages, and the response 
to it by Dowrick and Wells (2004). It is shown, using Lewis and MacDona ld ' s own 
preferred theoretical f ramework derived from Allen (1938), that their criticism is invalid 
when applied to the full elasticity (including" scale effects), although the constant output 
case is more ambiguous. The main argument of the chapter, however, is that the 
formula in question is purely microeconomic and applicable only at the industry level. 
Its use in macroeconomic models is completely unjustified. 
Since this topic has already been covered rather exhaustively, it seems relevant 
to point out that more recent work such as Connolly and Stevens (2007) still refers to 
the debate, that Dowrick and Wells (2004) did not prove their results using Lewis and 
MacDona ld ' s references to Allen via Hamermesh (1993), and that Hamermesh ' s 
standard work on labour demand is itself somewhat confused on the subject. 
Backgroimd 
Lewis (1998) and Lewis and MacDonald (henceforth LM) (2002) argued that previous 
est imates of the elasticity of demand for labour in Australia were fundamenta l ly flawed. 
While they employed some sophisticated econometr ics to provide new est imates of a , 
the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, their main critique was 
theoretical rather than empirical . 
The issue at stake is the interpretation of the elasticity formula - ( l - 5 ' ) ( 7 - . 9 ; 7 
(where is the labour share of income and /; is the own-price elasticity of demand for 
output). LM argued that this is a real wage elasticity: the (negative) percentage change 
in the demand for labour resulting f rom a one percent increase in the real wage, hi 
response, Dowrick and Wells (2004, henceforth DW) defended the standard view that 
this formula is, in fact, only a nominal wage elasticity, and that to obtain the real wage 
elasticity it is necessary to account for change in the price level. They also argue that 
there is no particular reason to assume that i] equals one, as LM do, and that one would 
need to estimate an aggregate demand curve as part of a complete macroeconomic 
model in order to just i fy using any particular value of J]. Without doing this, it is only 
possible to estimate the elasticity of substitution cr and the constant output elasticity of 
labour demand - ( l - . 9 ) c r (again, LM and DW disagree over whether this is real or only 
nominal). Finally, LM (2004) stood by their original arguments, claiming that the price 
level is purely exogenous in the standard neoclassical model defined by Hamermesh 
(1993) and Allen (1938), and that DW are only generating different results by making 
arbitrary assumptions about price setting. 
Variable Output Elasticities 
In order to evaluate these conflicting claims, I have turned to Allen (1938: 372-3), 
which LM and Hamermesh both cite as their original source. While I have used 
different notation and omitted some working, the assumptions and reasoning are 
identical. 
Suppose that we have the constant returns to scale production function 
Y = F{L,K), where Y is output, and L and K are labour and capital inputs respectively. 
Also define the nominal wage W, capital rental rate R, price of output P, and demand for 
output D(P). In this model, W and R are exogenous, nominal variables, P is an 
endogenous nominal variable (although the representative firm takes the price level as 
given, it is endogenous in the model as a whole), and L, K and Y are endogenous, real 
variables. Then, impose the following equilibrium conditions: 
Supply must equal demand, 
Y = D{P). (B. l) 
The representative firm maximises profits, PY - WL - RK, with respect to L and 
K. Hence, the marginal revenue product of labour must equal the nominal wage, 
PF^=W, (B.2) 
and the marginal revenue product of capital must equal the cost of capital, 
PF^ = R . (B.3) 
(Subscripts denote partial derivatives.) Now, differentiating (B.l), (B.2) and (B.3) with 
respect to the nominal wage W gives 
+ P F „ L , , + = l , a n d 
Pwf^ K + PP'KK^W = 0-
Now, the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is 
F Y ' LK' 
and since F is homogeneous of degree 1, 
I'LL = -^^LK and 
= ± F ' KK lk • 
A 
Therefore, we can write all second derivatives of F in terms of cr, K, F/^and Fk- Then, 
WL use (B.2) and (B.3) to substitute for Fi and Fk- Finally, write .y = for the labour 
PY 
RK 
share of output and ( 1 - 5 ) = - ^ for the capital share. Noting that PY + RK since 
factors are paid their marginal products, we obtain the elasticity of the price of output 
with respect to the nominal wage, 
vy 
C — = (B.4) 
As Hamermesh (1993:24) states, "When the wage rate increases, the cost of producing a 
given output rises. In a competitive market a 1 percent rise in a factor price raises cost, 
and eventually product price, by that factor 's share. This reduces the quantity of output 
sold.' 
Now, define the own-price elasticity of demand for output (the percentage fall in 
p 
demand for output demanded caused by a one percent increase in price) as 7] = - D p — . 
Then, the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the nominal wage is 
VV 
— (B.5) 
The first term, - ( l - .v ) (T , is the substitution effect, which can also be interpreted 
as a constant output elasticity. As labour becomes more expensive relative to capital, 
each unit of output will be produced with less labour (and more capital). The second 
term, -si], is the scale effect: the .v percent increase in price from (B.4) implies an srj 
percent decrease in output and employment. Because of the ^ percent price rise, the real 
product wage only rises by (l-.s') percent for every one percent increase in the nominal 
wage. We must divide (B.5) by this factor in order to obtain the real wage elasticity, 
— (B.6) 
" L \~s 
where vv = — . 
Constant Output Elasticities, the Cost of Capital and the Interest Rate 
It is intuitive to follow the same logic when it comes to the (nominal) constant output 
elasticity, - (1 - .s')fj. Adjusting for the price rise would lead to a real wage elasticity of 
- ( J . It is not self evident that this is the right thing to do, however: if output has not 
changed, then why should price? On the other hand, if one does not account for the 
price change, then the substitution and scale effect, measured in real terms, do not add 
up to (B.5). 
The value - ( l - s ) c r may also be derived from the cost minimisation problem 
min [WL + RK] with respect to L and K, holding Y and R constant, and raising W by one 
percent.^ This is completely independent of the demand for and price of output - if the 
analysis was performed in purely real terms i.e. m\n{wL + rK], with the real wage 
W R 
W - — rising by one percent and the real cost of capital ^ = ~ held constant, the 
' See the Append ix to this chapter . 
elasticity will again be - ( I - 5 ) c r , not - c r . Should the cost of capital be held constant 
in nominal or real terms? And how does this cost relate to the interest rate, which is 
usually considered as being identical? 
In the marginal condition R=P.FK or the cost function (RK+WLJ, R represents 
the nominal user cost of one unit of capital for one period. If we assume no inflation, 
depreciation or risk premium, and that financial assets yield a (nominal and real) interest 
rate of then to make owning capital equally attractive we must have I-R/PK, where PK 
is the purchase price of a unit of capital. There are now two possibilities. Firstly, 
output and capital may be different goods. If the industry or economy being considered 
(not just the representative firm) is a price taker in the capital goods market, PK may be 
set equal to 1 without loss of generality. Then we have i=R. A constant interest rate 
implies a constant nominal cost of capital. Alternatively, in a one good model, P=PK, 
so i=R/P. The interest rate here is equal to the real cost of capital. (Neither LM nor 
DW specify which assumption they use.) 
Micro vs Macro Models 
Allen's analysis is explicitly microeconomic, based on a representative price-taking 
firm in an industry with a given product demand curve. In this context, a one percent 
increase in the nominal wage is also a one percent increase in the real wage of labour 
measured in terms of consumer goods, assuming that the good being produced is an 
infinitesimal fraction of the consumption basket. The same formula can be applied to a 
macroeconomy by constructing an aggregate demand curve with elasticity ;; (which is 
not necessarily equal to one), and a horizontal aggregate supply curve. DW do this 
explicitly, and anyone using the Allen formulae does so implicitly. In this case, 
however, it is no longer plausible to assume that the change in the product price does 
not affect real wages . This change f rom the micro to macro scales may account for 
some of the confus ion . 
Even with the appropria te ad jus tments , however , the Allen model does not seem 
part icularly suitable as a source of s tandard fo rmulae in mac roeconomic work. As ide 
f r o m the diff icul t ies in choos ing a plausible value of i] and the appropria te a ssumpt ions 
for the cost of capital, there are s impler and more plausible alternatives, hi the short run, 
a constant capital stock would imply a real wage elasticity of — ^ i,-, the long run, a 
\-s 
constant return to capital (in a So low-Swan steady state or under perfect capital 
mobil i ty) implies an endogenous real wage (infinitely elastic labour demand) . These 
are the al ternatives used in studies of immigrat ion such as Bor jas and Katz (2005) and 
Ot tav iano & Peri (2005). A more sophist icated dynamic model such as T R Y M could 
also trace out the ad jus tment path (e.g. Song, Freebairn and Harding 2001). These 
assumpt ions would seem to be more relevant when consider ing an economy-wide w a g e 
shock, which is after all the motivat ion for est imating labour demand elasticit ies at a 
macro level. It is worth noting that even the canonical labour demand text, Hamermesh 
(1993: 339-40), uses the constant output elasticity - ( l - . v ) ( 7 when discussing 
employmen t fluctuations over the business cycle! 
Summary and Conclusion 
In the Allen (1938: 372-3) model used by Hamermesh (1993) and Lewis and 
MacDona ld (2002) as the basis for their calculat ions, the price of output is endogenous 
and is af fec ted by the nominal wage. Therefore , it makes no sense to calculate a labour 
demand elasticity with the output price held constant . In this regard, Lewis and 
Dif fe ren t i a t e the finst o rder condi t ion FL=W/P with respect to W/P a s suming cons tan t K. and then m a k e 
the appropr i a t e subst i tu t ions f r o m sect ion III. 
MacDonald 's criticism of common practice is unjustified. Otherwise, the use of this 
microeconomic model to derive macro-level labour demand elasticities is problematic. 
It seems preferable to simply interpret o as an elasticity of substitution, which is 
sufficient to allow comparison of different estimates, and to make an explicit 
assumption about the supply of capital if a labour demand elasticity is required. 
Appendix 
The Lagrangian for the cost minimisation problem is WL + RK + A[Y - F {L,K)] . The 
first order conditions combined yield Wf"^ = RF,, which when differentiated with 
respect to W becomes F^^K,, + F^^L,, ) = R{ + ) . Similarly the 
constraint Y^F{L,K) implies + Making the same substitutions as 
before for the second order derivatives, but noting that the first order conditions now 
contain the Lagrangian multiplier e.g. AF^ = W , we obtain the elasticity 
L {WL + RK)' 
Assuming that we begin from a position of profit maximisation, where X - 1 and labour 
and capital are paid their marginal products, this reduces to - (1 - s)(7. 
It is also possible to obtain the value of - c r for the real wage, constant output 
elasticity if the rise in the nominal wage is accompanied by a fall in the nominal cost of 
capital that keeps the profit maximising level of output, and hence price, constant: 
(^lAv + + + Combining this with the results obtained 
under the assumption of profit maximisation" we find the total elasticity 
W 
" Including (B.4) , K^^ — = s i O - T j ) , and, by symmei ry , ihe elastici t ies of L and K with respect to R. 
K 
clLW , W R ^ cIR W^ 
clW R dW L " L " L 
which is also a real wage elasticity since price is constant. 1 would argue that this is a 
reasonable interpretation of D W ' s equation 7, which is a labour demand curve 
l n ( L ) = . . . - < 7 l n ( W / P ) + l n ( r ) . . . , implying a constant output real wage elasticity of 
- ( J . This demand curve is derived from the marginal condition PF^ = W . Since this is 
a profit maximising condition, the output term on the right hand side is endogenous. 
(As can be seen above, the first order conditions in the cost minimisation problem both 
contain a Lagrangian multiplier.) It is not consistent to arbitrarily set Y constant - there 
must be some force offsetting the rise in W t o keep the profit maximising level of output 
constant. 
.>.-.-- • s r f / i - f i t i J r a V ' 
"•y- J 
CHAPTER B2: A NOTE ON IMMIGRATION AND 
AVERAGE WAGES 
In recent years, there has been a vigorous debate over the impact of immigration on the 
US labour market, particularly on the wages of unskilled native workers. A common 
approach (see Borjas 2003, Borjas and Katz 2005, Ottaviano and Peri 2005, 2006 and 
Aydemir and Borjas 2006) is to estimate a multi-level CES production function for the 
US economy, with the labour input sub-divided by education and experience. Estimates 
of the elasticity of substitution between different groups of workers combined with the 
supply of immigrants in each group are used to find the effect of immigration on 
relative wages. The latest estimates of this effect for US born high school dropouts are 
between -1.1% (Ottaviano and Perlini 2006) and -3.8% (Aydemir and Borjas 2006). 
This is only a small share of the observed 24.4% fall in this group's wages, relative to 
the average, between 1990 and 2004 (Ottaviano and Perlini 2006:32). 
The absolute effect of immigration on wages, however, also depends on the 
behaviour of the capital stock. The standard assumption in this literature is a constant 
return to capital in the long run, which implies that immigration does not change the 
average wage. Only changes in relative wages need to be considered. Ottaviano and 
Peri (2006:10) give the most explicit justification: "As for the long-run response of 
capital, any model of growth (Solow, 1956; Ramsey, 1928) as well as empirical 
evidence imply that capital adjusts to maintain its real return (and capital output ratio) 
constant." 
This approach implicitly treats immigration as a one-off shock, which increases 
the size, but not the growth rate, of the labour force. While this may be appropriate for 
particular episodes such as the Mariel boatlift (Card 1990), it is clearly not an accurate 
description of migration in general. '^ Once immigrat ion is treated as a cont inuous How, 
adding a little bit to the population every year, it can be seen that a change in the rate of 
immigrat ion will change the growth rate of the labour force. This in turn changes the 
steady state growth path, in particular the capital stock per worker on which the average 
wage depends. In this chapter, we derive the effect of a change in labour force growth 
on the average wage in a Solow-Swan model . A simple back of the envelope 
calculation of the size of this effect in the United States, indicates a reduction of over 
5% in the average wage, although, for various reasons, this is probably an overest imate. 
Theory 
Consider the standard Solow-Swan model e.g. in Romer (2006: ch . l ) , with a Cobb-
Douglas production function, 
(B.7) 
The equation of motion for the capital stock is 
^-^.sV-SK 
dt 
where is the savings rate and S is the depreciation rate. The steady state with a 
f K \ 
constant capital stock per effect ive worker is given by 
V A L j 
Y . K 
O t t a v i a n o and Peri (2006 :10) : " I m m i g r a t i o n is an o n g o i n g p h e n o m e n o n , d i s t r ibu ted o v e r years , 
p red ic t ab le and ra ther s low . . . It is r easonab le , t he re fo re , to think of this i ssue m o r e d y n a m i c a l l y with 
i nves tmen t s con t inuous ly r e s p o n d i n g to the f l ow of i m m i g r a n t w o r k e r s . " 
where n and g are the growth rates of the labour force L and labour augmenting 
productivity A respectively. In this steady state, the capital stock per actual worker is 
given by 
/ \ 1 
l n ( s y l ) - l n { J + » + g ) ] (B.8) 
_ 1 r 
In 
using (B.7). The derivative of (B.8) with respect to labour force growth is 
a i n ( / C / L ) _ - 1 
dn a{5 + n + g)' 
{B.9) 
Now, from the marginal product condition = and (B.7), the elasticity of the 
oL 
average wage vy with respect to the capital stock per worker is 
3 lnw' - , 
Combining (B.9) and (B.IO) using the chain rule gives 
Binw 
( B . l l ) 
dn + 
This derivative is the semi elasticity of the average wage with respect to the population 
growth rate - the percentage change in the steady state wage resulting from a one 
percentage point increase in labour force growth. This is a level effect - in the new 
steady state the wage will continue to grow at rate g but on a permanently lower path. 
Empirics 
How big is this fall in the average wage? A labour share a of 2/3 is typical, and Romer 
(2006:25) calibrates depreciation plus population and productivity growth ((5+n+g) to 
0.06. These numbers imply a value of -S'/s for the semi elasticity in equation ( B . l l ) . 
Legal migration of people aged between 15 and 64 to the US was around 1 million per 
year for fiscal years 2004 through 2006 (Office of Immigration Statistics 2007). In 
addition Hanson (2006:7) estimates a net illegal inflow of 350 000 to 580 000 per year. 
The size of the civilian labour force is 152 million with participation rate of 66% (BLS 
2007). The same ratio applied to immigrants (possibly an underestimate, particularly 
for illegals) would mean an annual addition of about 1 million - % of a percentage point 
- to labour force growth. Multiplying by -S'/s implies that migration reduces the average 
wage in the steady state by over 5%. This is larger than the estimated 1.1 to 3.8% 
change in dropout wages, relative to the average, mentioned in the Introduction.'^ 
The above analysis assumes a closed economy with respect to capital. Will 
investors respond to lower wages and higher profits with capital inflows that restore the 
previous rate of return? The United States is surely too large to be a price taker in 
international capital markets. Furthermore, much of the current capital inflow is being 
driven by central banks, which are not going to increase their holdings of US assets in 
response to a fall in US w a g e s . E v e n if capital mobility eliminated a majority of the 
effect of migration on the average wage, there could still remain an impact of 
comparable size to the changes in relative wages estimated in the literature. 
Another objection might be that the capital-labour and capital-output ratios 
given in Ottaviano and Peri (2006:30,50) rule out significant effects from immigration. 
However, these ratios only show convergence to a long run trend without specifying the 
determinants of that trend. A lower rate of immigration would have meant a different 
steady state, with slower labour force growth and a higher capital-labour and capital-
output ratios. 
" Th i s calculat ion is not strictly comparab le with the li terature discussed, s ince the labour input is a 
s imple headcount rather than a C E S aggregate . Howeve r , it should give some indicat ion of potent ial 
magni tudes , as well as being of interest in its own right. 
A perverse e f fec t on capital Hows is possible - lower U S wages make US t radeables m o r e compet i t ive , 
reduc ing the t rade defici t at a fixed exchange rate and therefore lower ing fore ign central b a n k s ' 
accumula t ion of U S D reserves. 
Conclusion 
The effect of immigration on native wages depends crucially on the behaviour of the 
capital stock. Modelling immigration as a one off shock, as is done in much of the 
literature, minimises its effects by implying that the average wage is unchanged in the 
long run. Treating immigration more realistically, as a continuous f low, reveals that it 
changes the rate of growth of the labour force, which affects the capital stock per 
worker and thus the average wage, even in the long run. A simple calculation of this 
effect in the standard Solow-Swan model implies that current immigration f lows to the 
US would reduce the steady state average wage by over 5%, if immigration was not 
matched by additional capital inflows. Even if the majority of the fall in wages was 
arbitraged away by foreign investment, the remainder could still be comparable to the 
previously estimated effect on the relative wages of native unskilled workers. 

PARTC 
WHY DON'T RELATIVE WAGES AFFECT 
EMPLOYMENT (VERY MUCH)? 
Many empirical studies have found little or no employment penalty f rom m i n i m u m 
wages and other interventions to raise the price of labour. These f indings seemingly 
cast doubt on the validity of the Law of Demand in labour markets . This essay argues 
that several c o m m o n explanat ions for these f indings lack suff icient ev idence to be 
persuasive. It proposes an alternative: that the demand for labour is much less elastic at 
the occupat ional level than at the aggregate level. This hypothes is is shown to be 
consistent with a range of stylized facts about the labour market , whi le the rival 
explanat ions are not. 

CHAPTER CI. INTRODUCTION 
Clearly these advocates very much want to beheve that the price of labor - unlike that of gasoline, or 
Manhattan apartments - can be set based on considerations of justice, not supply and demand, without 
unpleasant side effects. 
Paul Krugman, review of Living Wage, Washington Monthly. September 1 1998. 
There is a firm belief among economists that, all else being equal, an increase in the 
price of a good will reduce the amount purchased by consumers. So strong is this belief 
that it has become known as the Law of Demand. While long and diligent search may 
have revealed the occasional exception in the form of Giffen goods or status symbols, 
one may, on the whole, say that the empirical evidence for this proposition is as 
compelling as the theory. 
On the face of it, there seems to be no particular reason why labour should be 
exempt from this law: why, if the wage rate (or other costs of employment) rises, 
employers will not respond by reducing the number of workers they hire. Indeed, since 
the demand for labour is usually a derived demand - workers are hired to produce goods 
and services, the revenue from which must cover the costs of their employment - the 
argument seems doubly strong. Not only will an increase in wages increase production 
costs and the product price, which will in turn reduce the final sales of the product and 
therefore the demand for labour in its production (the scale effect), but it will also 
provide an incentive to adopt techniques that produce the same output with less use of 
labour (the substitution ejfect, so called because of the necessity to find other factors of 
production - machinery, energy etc. - to substitute for the diminished application of 
labour). So much is standard in any microeconomics or labour economics text. 
The logic seems compelling. Yet, as we will see in chapters C2 and 3, it has 
been hotly contested both empirically and theoretically. Moreover, the dispute is not 
purely academic, but has important policy and political implications. If wages could be 
raised by fiat with little or no effect on employment, it would provide a popular and 
seemingly painless way to raise the income of a large part of the population. 
Conversely, if there was a large employment penalty, the wage hike would hurt the very 
people it was ostensibly designed to aid. 
In the political arena, it is interesting to note that, despite several decades of free 
market reform that have left rent and commodity price controls a distant memory in 
most jurisdictions, 21 out of 30 OECD countries have a statutory national minimum 
wage, and most of the others rely on collective bargaining and industry-specific laws to 
achieve the same effect (Martin & Immervol 2007). One would have to look at 
infrastructure natural monopolies such as transport, power, and telecommunications, or 
sectors like defence, health, and education where the government is a major buyer, to 
find a market in which government still intervenes so directly in price formation. 
Furthermore, while most modern states have some kind of agency dedicated to detecting 
and punishing anti-competitive behaviour in the product market, the right of 
combination in the labour market is endorsed in Article 23 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. For some reason, lawmakers still seem to believe that wages can be 
set based on 'considerations of justice', even when they have abandoned this belief with 
respect to gasoline and apartments. If an author may be forgiven for concentrating on 
his own backyard, the Australian experience in the last tew years provides a perfect 
illustration of this contrast. Large and rapid rises in the prices of petrol, food, and 
housing did not result in any kind of price controls being adopted, or even seriously 
advocated as a policy response. In the same period, an attempt to weaken (not abolish) 
statutory minimum wages and conditions in a number of occupations was met with 
outrage, and was the key issue in the fall of a government which had held power for 
over a decade (Brett 2007, Roy Morgan 2007). 
Simply because a belief is commonly and stubbornly held by the public is not, of 
course, a guarantee of its correctness. Public choice theory or behavioural economics 
might provide a number of explanations for why popular delusions about wages and 
employment are particularly hard to shift. On the other hand, the beliefs of the public, 
however crude and uninformed, may reflect an important aspect of reality. Such an 
argument is made in the following chapters. 
We begin in chapter C2 with a survey of the empirical evidence on the effect of 
minimum wages, equal pay laws, and wage setting institutions on employment. This 
survey reveals a lack of consensus on whether these interventions do, in fact, have an 
employment penalty. Even those studies that do find a negative employment effect 
typically report that it is quite small. 
In chapter C3 we move on to possible theoretical explanations for this lack of 
consensus. First, we consider the possibility of mismeasurement: that the part of the 
literature finding a lack of employment effects is systematically biased in some way. 
Then, assuming that this is not the case, monopsony, efficiency wage and aggregate 
demand theories are considered as alternate possibilities. It is argued that all of these 
are unconvincing for various reasons. 
Chapter C4 presents an alternative hypothesis: that the explanation lies in the 
nature of production technology, not in mismeasurement or some peculiarity of the 
labour market. Specifically, it is argued that the demand for labour becomes much less 
elastic as labour is disaggregated by occupation. This argument is illustrated with a 
'Leontief/Cobb-Douglas' function in which the labour input in a Cobb-Douglas function 
is a Leontief aggregate of different occupations. Various properties of this function are 
derived, and some objections considered. 
The superiority of this explanation over its rivals is further argued in chapter C5. 
Here, a range of stylized facts about the labour market are presented. While the 
technological theory is a good fit for all of them, the other candidates are compatible 
with hardly any. 
Finally, chapter C6 presents some richer versions of the basic model in chapter 
C4. These show that the technology hypothesis can be extended to take account of 
substitution between different goods, nonzero substitution between different types of 
labour, capital-skill complementarity, and heterogenous skill levels within occupations, 
without losing its essential properties. Chapter C7 summarises and concludes. 
CHAPTER C2. EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF 
MINIMUM WAGES & OTHER INSTITUTIONS 
The inverse relationship between quantity demanded and price is the core proposition in economic 
science . . . Just as no physicist would claim that "water runs uphill", no self-respecting economist would 
claim that increases in the minimum wage increase employment. . . . Fortunately, only a handful of 
economists are willing to throw over the teaching of two centuries; we have not yet become a bevy of 
camp-fol lowing whores. 
James Buchanan (1986 Nobel laureate in economics). Wall Street Journal, April 25 1996. 
In this chapter, we review the empirical Hterature on the effect that minimum wages, 
equal pay for women, and wage setting institutions have on employment. Although the 
studies are grouped into these categories for convenience, it must be emphasised that 
they are all variations on the same basic theme - whether forcing employers to pay 
higher wages will cause them to reduce the number of workers they employ. For this 
reason, the term 'wage floor' is sometimes used as shorthand to cover all such 
situations, whether they are the result of a statutory minimum, collective bargaining, or 
some other institutional arrangement. 
Minimum wages 
Card and Kreuger's book Myth and Measurement (1995) is probably the best known 
challenge to the proposition that a binding minimum wage will necessarily reduce 
employment. The book is based on several of the authors' papers, some co-authored 
with Lawrence Katz. The most f amous of these was Card and Kreuger (1994), which 
examined the response of New Jersey fast food restaurants to a rise in that s ta te ' s 
min imum wage. Based on their own survey data, they found that employment actually 
increased in these establishments, compared to those in neighbouring Pennsylvania (in 
which the min imum did not rise). In addition, this effect was more pronounced in those 
New Jersey stores with the lowest initial wages (where the rise in the min imum had the 
biggest effect), and was not seen at all in those stores which had an initial wage above 
the new min imum (and thus were not directly affected by the increase). This would 
seem to rule out any state-specific shock. Neither did they find any substitution of part-
for full- t ime workers, reductions in fr inge benefi ts , or reduction in store openings. 
These results were highly controversial, as shown by the quote at the beginning 
of this chapter. In particular, the accuracy of the survey data was questioned (Brown 
1995, Welch 1995). Neumark and Wascher (2000) at tempted to replicate the study 
using payroll data f rom an alternative source, and found that the New Jersey min imum 
wage had a negative effect on employment . Card and Kreuger (2000) responded by 
reproducing their earlier results with data f rom the Bureau of Labour Statistics, al though 
with lower statistical significance (most of the estimated employment effects were 
statistically indistinguishable f rom zero). Angrist and Pischke (2009:230-1) suggest 
that trend growth in employment was lower in Pennsylvania than New Jersey, 
invalidating the use of that state as a control. 
Whatever the final judgement on this debate, it relates to only a small part of the 
evidence in Myth and Measurement. As well as the work on the fast food industry 
based on Card and Kreuger ' s own surveys (and a similar study on Texas) , the book 
included other cross-state comparisons. Both the 1988 California and 1990-91 federal 
increases in the min imum wage were studied, using data f rom the Current Population 
Survey. In both cases, those states most affected by the rise did not show any evidence 
of employment losses relative to states where the change had little or no impact on 
wages. This result held true whether teenage, retail or restaurant employment was 
considered. 
In addition, the book highlighted weaknesses in the existing literature. A meta-
analysis of the existing time series literature found evidence of specification searching 
and/or publication bias, which severely undermined the previous consensus estimate of 
a one to three percent fall in teenage employment in response to a ten percent increase 
in wages (Brown, Gilroy and Cohen 1982). Analysis of particular papers found severe 
specification issues. Of particular interest was the discussion of Puerto Rico, where the 
minimum wage has a much greater effect than in the rest of the United States due to the 
lower average level of wages. Despite this, it is possible to eliminate negative 
employment effects f rom the standard regression equation by simply weighting the 
observations by industry size. 
A large amount of work on minimum wages has, of course, been done since 
1995. Neumark and Wascher (2006) surveyed over 90 minimum wage studies from 
many different countries published in the subsequent decade. Although two thirds of 
these find negative employment effects (not always statistically significant), and less 
than ten find positive effects, they conclude that 'Clearly, no consensus now exists 
about the overall effects on low-wage employment of an increase in the minimum 
wage. ' (p. 115) Worthy of particular attention is O E C D (1998), which combines data 
from nine countries in a panel regression. Various specifications consistently find 
small, negative employment effects for teenagers (of roughly the same magnitude as 
those in Brown, Gilroy and Cohen), and little effect for older workers. 
Equal pay 
Equal pay laws are another institutional mechanism which can alter the wages paid by 
employers. The concept of 'equal pay' can be difficult to define philosophically - equal 
for all men and women, or just those working full time, doing the same job, or jobs that 
require the same level of education and experience? Despite these ambiguities, in 
practice such laws have had the effect of substantially raising women ' s wages relative 
to men's . 
Australia implemented such regulations between 1969 and 1975, through its 
centralised wage fixing tribunals. First implementing the principle of "equal pay for 
equal work", which had little effect on pay,'^ the tribunals moved on to the more 
ambitious "equal pay for work of equal value". Previously, occupations that were 
predominantly female had been awarded lower minimum rates of pay, based on the 
principle that a working man should be able to support a wife and child, while a 
working woman only had to support herself. This principle was now abandoned, with 
the result that women ' s wages rose by about 30% relative to men's . This change was 
seen both in the award rates of pay and women ' s actual earnings. 
Such a large change in the space of a few years would potentially have large 
effects on the economy, including female employment. Yet Gregory and Duncan 
(1981), from whom the above description is taken, find that the changes in employment 
as a result of this wage shock were rather small. They estimate that the elasticity of 
substitution between male and female labour was only 0.3 for the economy as a whole, 
0.6 in manufacturing (possibly biased upwards by tariff cuts and increasing international 
competition during the period), 0.3 in services and zero in government. 
W o m e n were explici t ly paid less than men in only a few, most ly publ ic service occupa t ions . T h e 
pr incip le had mainly been conceded e l sewhere for the very unfeminis t reason of p revent ing w o m e n f r o m 
undercu t t ing men with prof i t seeking employer s . 
Manning (1996) similarly found that the Equal Pay Act in the United Kingdom 
had no detrimental effect on female employment, despite a 10% rise in the relative pay 
of female workers. 
Institutions 
Aside from the level of their statutory minimum wage and the existence of equal pay 
laws, countries also differ more broadly in their wage setting institutions, such as the 
extent of and protection given to collective bargaining, and the generosity of 
unemployment benefits. Potentially, these differences affect both the distribution of 
wages and the degree of wage flexibility in response to demand or supply shocks. For 
example, it has been argued that skill-biased technical change has been reducing the 
demand for less skilled workers. Countries with more flexible wages can avoid 
unemployment by allowing wage inequality to increase, while countries which maintain 
the relative wages of the unskilled will see unemployment rise. This 'diabolical 
t radeoff (Krugman 1994) was a popular explanation for the strong employment 
performance of the United States relative to Western Europe in the late twentieth 
century. 
This argument was questioned by Gregory (1995), Krueger and Pischke (1997), 
and Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1999). Comparing the United States to Australia, 
Germany and Canada and France respectively, they show that, indeed, the United States 
has experienced both higher employment growth and a greater rise in wage inequality. 
However, the stronger job growth in the US has not been concentrated at the bottom of 
the wage distribution, as one would expect if flexible wages were the reason. Instead, 
job growth has been higher across the board. Similarly, Nickell and Bell (1996) have 
shown that unemployment in the US was equally or more concentrated among the low 
skilled relative to European countries, while Howell (2002) f inds no correlation between 
changes in unemployment and wage inequality within the O E C D as a whole. Again, 
this is the opposite of what the 'diabolical t r adeof f predicts. 
Summary 
There are strong theoretical arguments that a binding wage Ooor will reduce 
employment among affected workers, whether it is the result of a min imum wage, equal 
pay law or some other institutional arrangement. Yet we have seen that there is no 
consensus in the empirical literature on whether these interventions reduce employment 
at all, let alone on the size of the effect . Some studies even find a positive effect on 
employment , but this is unusual. Furthermore, even those studies that do find 
statistically significant employment losses generally find that that the elasticity is quite 
small, so that the affected workers as a group may enjoy higher total incomes despite 
some of them losing their jobs ." ' In the next chapter, we consider possible explanat ions 
for this empirical puzzle. 
O n e canno l , h o w e v e r , s imply quo te an elas t ic i ty with respec t to the m i n i m u m of , say , -0.1 to -0 .3 fo r 
t eenage labour and say that the d e m a n d is inelast ic , s ince s o m e t eenagers will earn m o r e than the 
m i n i m u m wage . W e wou ld need to k n o w the elas t ic i ty of the ave rage wage for t eenage r s with respec t to 
the m i n i m u m to m a k e this ca lcu la t ion . 
CHAPTER C3. MONOPSONY AND OTHER 
EXPLANATIONS 
W e bel ieve there is a need to r e fo rmula t e the set of theoret ical mode l s that are appl ied to the l o w - w a g e 
labour market . . . 
Ca rd and Kreuge r (1995 :397 ) 
Since the findings in the previous chapter are somewhat counterintuitive, at least for a 
trained economist, they have naturally provoked controversy. Many have flatly denied 
their validity. Some of the more common objections are summarised first, under the 
heading of 'mismeasurement ' . If one accepts that there is a puzzle to be solved, 
however, then one must enter the equally contentious area of potential explanations. 
Theoretically, several consistent arguments may be made as to why higher wages need 
not reduce employment. The claim that employers enjoy significant monopsony power 
in the labour market is perhaps the most common. Efficiency wages and aggregate 
demand are also considered. 
Mismeasurement? 
One way to deal with a puzzle is to argue that it does not really exist: that the data is 
inaccurate or has been misinterpreted. In this case, the first option is difficult to sustain. 
Aside from Card and Krueger 's fast food surveys (which we have seen were only one 
part of their work), all of the cited studies were based on government or other standard 
statistical sources. 
This could still be a problem if official sources do not measure employment 
accurately in the first place. We might, for example, conjecture that illegal immigrants 
account for much of the low-wage j ob growth in the United States in recent decades 
(Hanson 2006), but that because they are illegal, they are not counted in the 
employment statistics, and that, fur thermore, they are fired before native workers when 
employment contracts (so that the jobs lost to a min imum wage hike do not show up). 
If the United States has experienced a large amount of unmeasured low-wage j o b 
growth, then perhaps that country ' s more flexible relative wages really were the cause 
of its stronger jobs growth relative to Canada, Western Europe and Australia. For this 
explanation to work, however, illegal employment would have to have grown more 
rapidly in the US than elsewhere, which seems plausible for Canada and Australia but 
less so for Europe with migration f rom North Afr ica and Eastern Europe. Indeed, 
because of Europe ' s high payroll taxes and restrictive labour laws, some have argued 
that the black economy is more important there than in the United States (Schneider & 
Enste 2000). Of course, one may also argue that informal employment is irrelevant to 
the argument if the minimum wage does not apply to that sector in the first case: the key 
question is the effect of the min imum wage on the (legal) covered sector, which is 
presumably measured in the official statistics. 
If the data itself is hard to question, that only leaves the question of 
interpretation. Perhaps there are large employment effects hidden in the data and the 
researchers have simply not asked the right quest ions to extract them. Whi le correct 
specification is a lways a vexed issue in econometrics, it is not particularly likely to be a 
problem here on two grounds. First is the relative simplicity of the methods, which 
generally consist of simple comparison of treatment and control groups, or re-estimation 
of equations from previous studies. Second is the range of the evidence, which includes 
a range of shocks, statistical methods, countries and researchers. Any bias due to 
individual idiosyncrasies on any of these dimensions should not be enough to 
contaminate the entire literature. 
One more systematic issue that has been raised is the appropriate time period to 
allow for employment to adjust in response to a wage shock. For example. Brown 
(1995) and Hamermesh (1995) have suggested that Card and Kreuger's 'before' and 
'after' observations (typically six months either side of a minimum wage increase) are 
both inaccurate: the 'before' observation comes after the minimum wage is announced 
(and thus may already include some adaptation) and the 'after' observation leaves 
insufficient time for full adjustment. Furthermore, since minimum wage increases are 
generally eroded by inflation, the response we see may underestimate the effect of a 
permanent increase. (This point may be raised more generally about any specification 
that employs a particular lag, which is typically one year.) While doubtless these points 
have some validity, are they strong enough to reverse and not just attenuate the results? 
One must note that the first two objections seem somewhat contradictory - one implying 
extremely rapid adjustment, and the other extremely slow adjustment. They also apply 
to the substitution effect (the adjustment to production techniques that use less low-
skilled labour), but not the scale effect (the reduction in output due to the increase in 
price). As will be seen in the next chapter, these problems do not seem so serious when 
it comes to the response of total employment to an increase in the average wage. 
Ironically, Hamermesh (1993:294) himself states that 'The speed of adjustment of 
employment or worker-hours in response to shocks is fairly rapid. Taking the approach 
of static expectations, most of the gap is made up within a year. Nearly half is covered 
within one quarter of a shock . . . Adjus tment of the employment of unskilled workers is 
faster than that of skilled workers . ' 
The strongest rebuttal to this point, however , is provided by the cross-country 
literature on wage inequality and employment that was discussed at the end of the 
previous chapter. This literature deals with time periods measured in decades. It is hard 
to think of any plausible costs that would delay adjustment for that length of time. 
Monopsony 
Invoking the law of demand in the labour market assumes that individual employers 
have access to an unlimited supply of labour at a fixed wage. W e might instead assume 
that f irms face a tradeoff between the wage they pay (or other costs of employment) and 
the number of workers they can hire. Such an assumption is the foundation of 
monopsony models of the labour market. Under certain conditions, a binding wage 
floor can sometimes increase employment in these models. 
The simplest model of monopsony is that of an individual firm facing an upward 
sloping labour supply curve. The firm maximises profits by setting a wage below the 
marginal product of labour, just as a monopoly maximises profits by pricing above 
marginal cost. '^ A binding wage floor can actually increase employment as long as it is 
set below the marginal product of labour. More sophisticated models of monopsony 
and 'o l igopsony ' (with multiple employers) are described in Boal and Ransom (1997) 
and Manning (2003). As in the simpler version, they assume that individual f irms face 
some tradeoff between labour costs and labour supply, leading to a gap between the 
marginal product of labour and the wage. Search models of the labour market can have 
" The pront maximising condition sets the marginal product of labour equal to the marginal cost, 
w+L(dw/dL), where dw/dL > 0. Counterintuitively, a binding minimum wage can lower the marginal cost 
of labour by setting dw/dL to zero - the firm no longer has the option of paying a lower wage and 
accepting the consequent reduction in labour supply. 
similar implications (e.g. Rocheteau and Tasci 2008), although the wage is often set 
through a bargaining process rather than unilaterally by the employer. 
This explanation is intuitively appealing. As Manning (2003) states repeatedly, 
a wage cut of one cent would not cause all workers to quit a firm immediately. Card 
and Kreuger (1995) suggested monopsony as an explanation of their minimum wage 
findings. More recently. Manning (2003) has argued that monopsony explains a wide 
range of puzzling labour market phenomena such as the employer size-wage effect, 
wage dispersion, and returns to tenure. 
Yet, for our purposes, the crucial question is not the existence of monopsony 
power per se, but the size of the gap between wage and marginal product in actual 
labour markets. It is only in this gap that a binding minimum wage will not reduce 
employment below its initial level. 
In the individual firm model the 'rate of exploitation', the proportion by which 
the marginal product of labour exceeds the wage, is equal to the inverse of the elasticity 
of labour supply to the individual firm. (This is analogous to the Lerner index for a 
f i rm's product market power.)'^ Card and Kreuger (1995: 376-7) argue that a rate of 
exploitation of 10-20% is 'potentially plausible', based on an elasticity of supply of 5-
10, but their own estimates suggest an elasticity between 20 and 50 ie a rate of 
exploitation between 2 and 5%. Manning (2003) admits that direct estimates of this 
elasticity do not consistently support a large degree of monopsony, and relies on more 
indirect evidence. 
More recent work has not changed this situation. Hirsch and Schumacherb 
(2005) find that monopsony power is not evident in the labour market for registered 
nurses in the US, which is often cited as a classic example of monopsony. Fakhfakh 
From above we have MPL=w+L(clw/dL) which rearranges to (MPL-w)/w = (L/w).(dw/dL). C.f. the 
Lerner index: (P-MC)/P = -(Q/P).(dP/dQ). 
and Fitzroy (2006) find a long run elasticity of labour supply to the individual firm of 
10, implying a rate of exploitation of 10%. (Short run effects may increase this by 
another 4 to 6 percentage points.) Manning (2006) estimates a more complicated 
dynamic model based on recruitment costs and finds a rate of exploitation of only 3%, 
although he argues that this is an underestimate. 
So, while monopsony may be an important feature of the labour market, it has 
yet to be proven that it can explain the full range of evidence considered in the previous 
chapter. For example, Card and Krueger (1995) consider changes in the minimum wage 
from $3.30 to $4.25 and $4.25 to $5.05 per hour (27% and 19% respectively), and 
Gregory and Duncan (1981) a rise in women's relative wages of 30%. These rises are 
larger than any monopsony wedge from the above estimates. Also, they did not come 
from a starting position of an unregulated labour market, but off a base of already 
binding minima. A large part of the wage rises would not be absorbed by the wage-
marginal product gap and should therefore reduce employment below its initial level, 
even under the monopsony assumption. Yet such reductions were not observed, or were 
quite small. 
Efficiency wages 
Another way in which the negative effects of a minimum wage may be offset is if it 
increases labour productivity at a given level of employment. (It is not sufficient that 
productivity rise as a result of a higher capital-labour ratio or higher average skill levels, 
in response to the least skilled workers being made redundant.) If workers are prepared 
to work harder to justify their continued employment at a higher wage, employment 
may increase along with the wage. This result is possible both in efficiency wage 
settings where effort is not observable (Manning 1995) and in the standard competitive 
model where effort is observable and hence subject to contract (Deltas 2007). It 
depends, however, on rather strict conditions which the authors do not support with 
empirical evidence, or even spend much time trying to justify.'^ The full information 
story also has the rather disconcerting implication that workers are worse off with 
higher wages and more employment, because of their valuation of effort. (This is rather 
similar to the case when higher wages are offset by lower working conditions or fringe 
benefits.) 
Aggregate Demand 
From a macroeconomic point of view, sticky prices or bad monetary policy may 
produce an interest (and/or exchange) rate which acts as a constraint on employment, no 
matter how flexible wages are (Barro and Grossman 1971, Romer 2006: 246). Since the 
demand for labour is a derived demand, there is no point in employing a worker, no 
matter how low their wage, if it is impossible to sell the output they produce. In this 
situation an additional worker's value marginal product is zero, whether their physical 
marginal product is greater than their real wage (expressed in terms of the current but 
non market clearing product price) or not. Essentially, the labour demand curve 
becomes vertical once a certain level of output has been reached. As with monopsony, 
an increase in wages need not reduce employment as long as the wage remains below 
the marginal product of labour. 
The importance of aggregate demand might provide an explanation for why real 
wages tend to be acyclical or procyclical, which has been an issue since Dunlop (1938). 
Galbraith (1998) also argues that wage inequality and unemployment tend to rise and 
In the e f f i c i ency wage mode l , the elast ici ty of the margina l revenue of a w a g e increase with respect to 
e m p l o y m e n t must be greater than one . In the full i n fo rmat ion mode l the worke r s ' coe f f i c i en t of relat ive 
risk avers ion must be less than one , and the d e m a n d for labour highly elast ic . 
fall together . If too high w a g e s for unski l led worke r s were the cause of u n e m p l o y m e n t , 
there should be no such re la t ionship. Indeed, one would expect the oppos i te : 
u n e m p l o y m e n t could only fall when the relat ive wages of the less skil led fel l , increas ing 
inequali ty. 
It wou ld be rather heroic , however , to a s sume that this is the typical state of an 
economy , rather than a t emporary condi t ion dur ing depress ions . It also does not rule 
out subst i tut ion (as opposed to scale) e f fec ts : even if total output is f ixed by aggrega te 
demand , it might still be prof i table to employ labour-sav ing techniques to p roduce that 
output more cheaply . 
Summan-
The literature arguing that wage f loors do not substant ia l ly reduce e m p l o y m e n t has met 
with a variety of responses . S o m e argue that the f ind ing is s imply mis taken , whi le 
others see it as evidence that the labour market is better descr ibed by m o n o p s o n y or 
e f f ic iency w a g e theory than perfect compet i t ion , or that aggregate d e m a n d rather than 
the real wage is the b inding constraint on employmen t . This chapter has argued that 
none of the above explana t ions is part icularly convinc ing . T h e burden , then, is on the 
author to provide a more convinc ing explanat ion. Such a candidate is presented in the 
next chapter . 
CHAPTER C4. A TECHNOLOGICAL THEORY 
W e cannot legi t imate ly speak , for example , of ' t he ' e last ici ty of the d e m a n d for labour , fo r this will vary 
with every d i f fe ren t kind of labour , a lmost with every f i rm, and with every d i f fe ren t set of condi t ions . 
T h e r e spons iveness of e m p l o y m e n t of all bu i ld ing w o r k e r s col lec t ively to c h a n g e s in wage- ra tes , for 
example , may be very high, whe reas the r e spons iveness of e m p l o y m e n t of electr ical instal lat ion w o r k e r s 
a lone to c h a n g e s in their wage- ra te s may be very low, because the d e m a n d for e lec t r ic ians is a j o in t 
d e m a n d with that for o ther bui ld ing workers . 
Hazli t t ( 1959 :271 ) 
The explanations considered in the previous chapter all treat labour as a homogeneous 
input. While they could doubtless be adapted to a world with more than one type of 
labour, the essential logic of each argument works just as well without this 
complication. Such a treatment is not a natural fit to the literature in chapter C2, which 
deals with cases where particular groups of workers had their wages increased relative 
to other groups of workers - teenagers bound by the minimum wage versus adults who 
are not, women affected by equal pay laws versus men, etc. The employment effects 
were also measured in relative rather than absolute terms, or at least estimated with 
some overall measure of employment as a control, in most of the studies. 
The puzzle, therefore, is not that the demand for labour as a whole is insensitive 
to wages, which is what all of the above explanations would imply. The puzzle is that 
the relative employment of particular groups of workers seems to be insensitive to 
relative wages. Stating the problem in such a way suggests an approach that 
emphasises the heterogeneity of labour. 
Such an approach is presented in this chapter. The hypothesis is s imply that the 
demand for labour becomes much less elastic when labour is disaggregated by 
occupation - that, as the above quote suggests, the demand for electricians is less elastic 
than the demand for building workers in general, which is in turn less elastic than the 
demand for labour as a whole. Af ter a brief intuitive discussion, the argument is 
formalised in a 'Leont ie f /Cobb-Douglas ' or ' L C D ' production funct ion, in which the 
labour input in a Cobb-Douglas function is a Leontief aggregate of workers in different 
occupations. While highly stylized, this function is presented as a useful first 
approximation, much like the ubiquitous Cobb-Douglas function itself. (More 
sophisticated and realistic extensions are presented in chapter C6.) The demand for 
labour derived f rom this function has the fol lowing properties: Employment in all 
occupations depends only on the average wage, so that relative wages do not affect 
labour demand. The own-wage elasticity of demand for labour in particular occupat ions 
is proportional to that occupat ion ' s share in wage income, so that the more finely labour 
is disaggregated, the less elastic demand becomes. And workers in different 
occupations are complements , not substitutes, for each other. Af ter these properties 
have been derived, some of the more obvious objections to the plausibility of the 
hypothesis are considered. 
Intuition 
The hypothesis of this chapter is that the nature of production technology makes the 
demand for labour in particular occupations quite inelastic, even if the demand for 
labour as a whole is not. Why might this be the case? 
Modern economies rely on a complex division of labour. It may be difficult to 
change one part of a production process (e.g. to substitute capital for labour) without 
making other, costly, changes elsewhere. A rise in wages representing a small share of 
total costs might not be a sufficient incentive to make such changes. If this is the case, 
the substitution as well as the scale effect of the wage change is likely to be small. 
There is much anecdotal evidence that this is the case in modern economies , 
even with seemingly simple products. Mokyr (1990:1 14-115) generalises that 'Before 
1850, technology consisted of more or less isolated chunks of knowledge in which 
sudden changes in production techniques could occur without dramatically affect ing 
other industries or producers . . . . After 1850, the complexity of technological systems 
increased . . . in such systems certain components may resist change in other parts of the 
system because compatibili ty with existing techniques has to be satisfied. ' He was 
anticipated by Marx (1887:ch. l5 , sec . l ) , who argued that 'A radical change in the mode 
of production in one sphere of industry involves a similar change in other spheres . . . 
Thus spinning by machinery made weaving by machinery a necessity, and both together 
made the mechanical and chemical revolutions that took place in bleaching, printing and 
dyeing imperative. ' More recently, Dugger (2004) describes how the spread of 
supermarkets in Central America is forcing farmers to adopt more capital intensive 
techniques, such as greenhouses and drip irrigation, in order to deliver more 
homogeneous produce. 
If such interdependency is an issue for textiles and vegetables, how much more 
must it be so with more complex products? To capture this intuition in mathematical 
form, and at the same time allow for capital-labour substitution in the aggregate, we 
adopt a functional form in which different types of labour are strongly complementary. 
(We will see in chapter C5 that this is also consistent with a wide range of empirical 
evidence.) 
Leontief/Cohb-Doiiglas technology 
Begin with a Cobb-Douglas production function in labour and capital. 
Now, suppose that each unit of labour L is made up of a, workers from each 
o f / = l , . . . ,« occupations. For example, in a string quartet of two violinists, a violist 
and a cellist, = c/, = 2 , and = c/j = 1. Hence the value of L is a Leontief 
function of the number of workers L from each occupation: 
L = min 
a, a„ 
Since there is no benefit from hiring more than the minimum necessary number of 
workers, the demand for labour in any occupation i is given by 
(C. l ) 
V / = ! , . . . ,«. LP is the demand for aggregate labour units, given under perfect 
competition by the usual marginal product condition YL=W. W, the average wage, is 
the cost of a labour unit: 
1=1 
where w is the wage rate in occupation /'. (All wages are in real terms throughout 
unless stated otherwise.) This implies 
PROPOSITION I: The demand for labour in all occupations depends only on the 
average wage, not on relative wages. 
This is a straightforward consequence of equation (C.l), which gives labour demand in 
all occupations as a function of the (fixed) occupational demand coefficients a, and 
aggregate labour demand l'^. L" is in turn a function of the average wage W, given the 
production function and capital stock. 'Relative wages' refers to the pattern of 
occupational wages, given the average wage W defined by equation (C.2). In other 
words, the average wage is a sufficient statistic for wages on the demand side. 
PROPOSITION 2: The own-wage elasticity of demand in any occupation is 
proportional to that occupation's share in total wage income. 
Assume that wages are exogenously determined (e.g. through perfectly elastic labour 
supply or binding wage floors in all occupations). Consider a change in wages in one 
occupation, holding all other wages constant. The elasticity of demand for labour in 
occupation j with respect to the wage in occupation k, using the chain rule, is 
w, aL^ _ az." aL" a w 
L'' dw, L" dL" dw dw, J ^ J ^ 
Denoting this quantity by Ejk, and using equations (C.l) and (C.2) to substitute for t f 
and W, this becomes 
(C.3) 
where 
(C.4) 
W 
is occupation A:'s share of wage income and 
is the elasticity of aggregate employment with respect to the average wage.^'' If the 
wage in occupation k is raised by one percent, holding all other wages constant, this 
' The value of E depends on the behaviour of the capital stock. See Appendix 4. 
raises the average wage by a percentage equal to occupation k's share of" wages. 
Employment in all occupations (the expression is independent of j) is reduced by this 
percentage multiplied by the elasticity of employment with respect to the average wage. 
The smaller an occupation's share of wages, the lower the own-wage elasticity it faces, 
hi terms of the Hicks-Marshall laws of derived demand, is small because any one 
occupation has a small share in total costs, and the substitution of labour for capital only 
works at an aggregate level (i.e. it is very limited when considering occupations 
individually). The own-wage elasticity, of course, is just the case where/=/:. 
PROPOSITION 3a: Workers in different occupations are p-complements for each other. 
It was shown above that increasing the wage in one occupation will increase the average 
wage and thus reduce the quantity of labour demanded in all other occupations. This 
argument is still valid if we hold output and the cost of capital constant, thus 
establishing p-complementarity. 
An interesting corollary of this result is that, if we relax our initial assumption 
and suppose that wages in other occupations are not completely fixed (e.g. if labour 
supply is not infinitely elastic, or minimum wages do not bind everywhere), this 
reduction in demand will produce offsetting wage cuts in other occupations. Therefore, 
in equilibrium, the average wage will rise by less than Sk percent for each one percent 
rise in Wk, and the employment losses will be even less than suggested by equation 
(C.4). 
PROPOSITION 3h: Workers in different occupations are q-complements for each other. 
W e now assume that there is an exogenous, perfectly inelastic supply of labour in each 
occupation, and show that, under these conditions, an increase in the number of workers 
in one occupation will tend to increase the wages in other occupations. This assumption 
means that demand will not equal supply in every occupation unless the relative supply 
across all occupations matches the fixed relative demands given by (C. 1). The effective 
aggregate supply of labour - the maximum available number of labour units with the 
necessary workers f rom all occupations - is given by 
^ n i i n ^ , . . . , ^ . (C.6) 
The limit to effective labour supply is given by those occupations for which L] - a-L^ _ 
There may be anything f rom one to n of these 'b inding ' occupations. The remaining 
'surplus ' occupations for which ^ have a greater supply of labour than can 
possibly be employed. 
Equilibrium employment and the average wage is obtained by setting L^ - LP . 
But what is the equilibrium wage for each occupation? For the surplus occupations, the 
combination of excess and perfectly inelastic supply (L f = a - L F < L f ) would 
push wages down to some reservation level (for simplicity, zero). For the binding 
occupations ( L f = L f ) , we have no further information that would allow us to 
determine their individual wages (unless there is only one binding occupation j, in 
which case The marginal product of labour is no help, since it is 
discontinuous: an extra worker in any single occupation has a marginal product of zero, 
while reducing employment by one in any occupation reduces the effective labour input 
by Ljcij and output by . This must be larger than Wj unless j is the only 
occupation to receive a nonzero wage. All we know is that the weighted sum of their 
wages, given by (C.2), must equal the equilibrium average wage given by L^ = L'\ 
Relative wages for the binding occupations are indeterminate. 
Now we may answer the original question: What will happen to wages if the 
supply of labour in one or more occupations is increased? The answer depends on 
which set of occupations is affected. If labour supply increases in the surplus 
occupations, the effective labour supply given by (C.6) is not affected and there is no 
change in anything aside from unemployment. If the increase is only in some subset of 
the binding occupations, these will be converted into surplus occupations. Again, there 
is no change in the effective labour supply, employment or the average wage. But 
assuming that wages fall in the occupations which have been converted from binding to 
surplus (i.e. assuming they were paid above reservation wages to begin with), wages in 
the remaining binding occupations must rise in order for the average to remain 
unchanged. Finally, if labour supply rises in all binding occupations, this will increase 
effecti ve labour supply and employment, and thus reduce the average wage However 
it will still increase wages in the initial surplus occupations if the increase in 
employment turns some of them into binding occupations. 
The effect of a wage floor under these assumptions would also vary depending 
on the occupations affected. As long as there are binding occupations not bound by the 
floor, these workers would absorb as wage cuts the others' wage rises, since the average 
wage must remain unchanged to maintain the equilibrium condition L^ = L''. But once 
all binding occupations are affected by the floor, then employment is demand 
Recall that the marginal product o f labour in this case is derived holding employment in other 
occupations constant, while the smooth labour demand curve underlying (C.4) is derived holding wages 
in other occupations constant. 
constrained rather than supply constrained. Further increases in the wage floor will 
increase the average wage and reduce employment according to the average wage 
elasticity E. 
Objections 
The LCD function is effectively a special case of the two-level constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function first described by Sato (1967). The elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital is one, giving the Cobb-Douglas part of the function, and the 
elasticity of substitution between the different components of the labour aggregate is 
zero, the Leontief component. 
While the use of CES functions to aggregate different types of labour is routine, 
the assumption of zero substitution between types is not.^^ However, the identification 
strategies used to generate these elasticities generally do not include exogenous wage 
shocks. (When they do, we get the results in chapter C2.) Furthermore, workers in 
these studies tend to be classed by personal characteristics, such as age, sex, and years 
of education, rather than the type of work they are doing, as is done here. There is only 
a small literature on the elasticity of substitution between different occupations. 
Unfortunately, it is rather dated, relies on implausible identifying assumptions (again, 
not including wage shocks), and gives a wild range of results. See Hamermesh 
(1993:108-118) who does not include any of its findings in his end of chapter summary 
of 'Things We Know'. 
Why disaggregate by occupation in the first place? Classifying by personal 
characteristics may be appropriate if one is interested in measuring the effect of 
immigration, equal pay legislation, or education on wages and employment. It is not 
^^  See H a m e r m e s h (1993) , and more recent ly the immigra t ion l i terature fo l lowing B o r j a s (2003) . 
necessarily suitable when considering the effect of governments or unions altering the 
wage structure. Collectively bargained or legislated wages tend to be specified as a rate 
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for the job rather than as a function of the characteristics of the individual worker. 
This type of disaggregation also seems fundamentally more satisfactory as a realistic 
description of production: why should the sex or age, or even the education, of the 
worker matter if they are doing the same job? Employers advertise for accountants, 
nurses, waiters etc, not generic workers of a particular age and education. Conversely, 
workers in different occupations - say doctors, engineers and lawyers - are not anything 
like perfect substitutes for each other simply because they are in the same age/education 
cell. Furthermore, if a worker switches jobs, it makes sense that their contribution in the 
production function should be reclassified to reflect this. 
Disaggregating by occupation rather than personal characteristics might 
plausibly reduce the ease of substitution between different types of labour. It certainly 
eliminates the simplest method, which is to have a different worker do the same job. As 
Neumark and Wascher (2008:62) state, 'the substitution by employers away from 
lower-skilled minimum wage workers towards higher-skilled, higher-wage workers is 
likely the principal source of disemployment effects of minimum wages.' This would 
be the case if, say, an employer replaced a teenage worker with an adult as the result of 
a minimum wage law. There has been a substitution of one worker for another, but 
from an occupational point of view employment has not changed as long as the same 
work is being performed. 
One might argue that, even if the LCD function is a reasonable representation of 
a particular industry, aggregation issues could make it a poor model of the economy as a 
" At first glance equal pay legislation would seem to contradict this. However, occupations are to a large 
degree segregated by sex. Gregory and Duncan (1981) found that in 1978, 83 percent o f Australian 
female workers were in occupations where the ratio of females to males was greater than in the workforce 
as a whole, a statistic that had changed little since 1911. The equal pay decision was significant because 
it raised the pay of female dominated occupations - "equal pay for work of equal value". 
whole. But if it is admitted, for the moment , that it can be used for a representative 
industry, then two conditions must hold to make it inapplicable at a macro level. There 
must be both (a) large differences in the composition of labour demand across the 
different industries, and (b) a large amount of substitution between the products of 
different industries. 
To see why, consider the following thought experiments. If different industries 
employ workers f rom different occupations, but the relative demand for their products is 
inelastic, then a rise of wages in one occupation will simply be passed on in the product 
price, without affecting employment. One group 's wage rise is everybody else 's wage 
cut. If, conversely, each industry uses workers from much the same occupations, then it 
does not matter if product demand is very elastic, since every industry will be affected 
equally if a particular occupation enjoys a rise in wages. Only if each industry has a 
highly unique employment pattern and elastic product demand will an increase in wages 
for one occupation flow through to lower production in particular industries which use 
that occupation intensively, and hence to lower employment in that occupation relative 
to others. 
Now, while there are many plausible situations in which (a) or (b) might be true, 
it is more challenging to argue that both are true simultaneously. In particular, the more 
finely different industries are disaggregated, the more likely it is that (b) is true, as the 
elasticity of demand for broad product groups is generally lower than that for specific, 
branded products (Clements 2007), but the less likely it is that (a) is true, as one would 
assume that the more similar the products are, the more similar the technology. This 
issue is considered further in chapter C6. 
Alternatively, the function may be a reasonable approximation of the 
macroeconomy without being accurate for any particular industry. The well known 
Baumol effect states that the relative price of labour intensive goods rises with income. 
For example, the price of consumption goods relative to investment goods tends to be 
higher in countries with higher income levels (Restuccia and Urrutia 2001). When 
combined with the fact that these labour intensive goods and services are still a large 
and even rising share of expenditure and employment as incomes rise, this may be an 
indication that there are large chunks of modern economies which still have very limited 
substitution of capital for labour. Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) and Hidalgo et al (2007) 
demonstrate that rich countries produce a different, more diverse range of products than 
poor countries, rather than simply producing homogeneous output with more capital 
intensive technology. This could further limit substitution possibilities in response to a 
wage shock. It should also be noted that the simplification in this model is not all in one 
direction: the Cobb-Douglas assumption of unit elasticity of substitution between 
capital and aggregate labour is probably an overestimate (Andersen, Klau & Yngaard 
1999). 
Finally, it may be argued that international trade makes purely national wage 
setting ineffective. If domestic wages in tradable industries are set too high, they will 
be undercut by import competition. While this has some force, the general consensus is 
that trade has had only a small effect on inequality in developed countries (see chapter 
A3). Certainly the forces of globalisation have not prevented countries within the 
OECD from having very different wage setting institutions and patterns of inequality, 
without obvious employment penalties. If wage setting institutions mainly affect 
relative rather than average wages, then total costs should not be much affected and 
there is little incentive to move production offshore. It has also been suggested that 
trade with low-wage countries is just not big enough relative to the size of developed 
economies to have a large effect on their wages. Whatever the reason, the law of one 
price is generally not seen as applying fully in global labour markets (Leamer 2007). 
Summary' 
This chapter has presented an alternative hypothesis for the empirical puzzle in chapter 
C2: that the demand for labour is much less elastic at the level of the individual 
occupation than it is at the aggregate level. This argument is formalised in a 
'Leont ief /Cobb-Douglas ' production function, in which different occupations are 
perfect complements for each other, implying that relative wages have no effect on 
employment. This admittedly stylized function is presented as a reasonable first 
approximation to reality, even when considering potential issues arising f rom 
aggregation and trade. We next consider how well it matches other features of the 
labour market, compared to the alternatives considered in chapter C3. 
Appemlix: Labour demand elasticities with Cohh-Douglas production 
The elasticity of demand for labour depends not only on the production technology, but 
also on the assumptions made about the supply of other factors of production. Some 
VV dL'^ 
possibilities for E ^ — , the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the 
L dW 
average wage, under the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function in labour 
and capital, are: 
Case 1: A competitive industry facing a given product demand function and constant 
cost of capital. As shown in chapter B l , Allen (1938:372-3) gives the elasticity 
^ sr]-i\-s)a, where W is the nominal wage, .v is the labour share of income, o is the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, and 7] is the (negative) own-price 
elasticity of product demand. Since s = a and a = \ in a Cobb-Douglas function, this 
expression reduces to a r j - { \ - a ) . The first term is the scale effect (a rise of 1% in the 
nominal wage means a s% rise in the product price and n sT]% fall in product demand) 
and the second the substitution effect, which can also be interpreted as a constant output 
elasticity. This reasoning is not, however, really applicable in a macroeconomic 
context, unless we have a country specializing in a single product for which it has some 
degree of market power. 
The above equation may also be considered as a real wage elasticity if the real 
wage is measured with respect to consumer goods, and the product of the industry in 
question is an infinitesimal part of the consumption bundle. For the producer real wage 
elasticity, simply divide by the percentage change in the product price (the elasticity of 
price with respect to the wage) s - a . 
Case 2: Constant capital stock. The standard assumption for the short run in a 
macroeconomic model - see chapter B2 for the contrast between this case and case 3. 
The labour demand function is LF - K 
I / \ a . - 1 implying E -
Case 3: Solow-Swan steady state or a small economy with perfect capital mobility. 
Either assumption fixes the return on capital and the capital-labour ratio. The average 
wage is then endogenous - i.e. the elasticity of demand is infinite. (This result is not 
specific to a Cobb-Douglas function - it holds for any nonzero rate of substitution 
between capital and labour.) Changes in relative wages simply redistribute income 
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CHAPTER C5. THEORIES VS. STYLIZED FACTS 
So far, we have seen a large amount of empirical evidence that the demand for labour is 
insensitive to relative wages. We have argued that the most common explanations for 
this observed insensitivity - mismeasurement, monopsony, efficiency wages, and 
aggregate demand - are unconvincing. And we have suggested an alternative 
hypothesis: that the nature of production technology makes the demand for labour in 
individual occupations (i.e. the demand for workers in particular jobs) inelastic. 
We now present a number of stylized facts about the labour market, which 
strengthen the case for the technology-based explanation versus the leading alternatives: 
mismeasurement, monopsony, efficiency wages, and aggregate demand. This exercise 
is not intended to disparage these theories in general: they may be perfectly valid 
explanations for other important phenomena in the labour market. The aim is merely to 
argue that they are inadequate to explain the observed insensitivity of employment to 
relative wages. The findings are summarised in Table C.3 at the end of this chapter. 
STYLIZED FACT 1: There is a robust empirical tradeoff between average wages and 
employment. 
Contrary to the situation with relative wages, this tradeoff is well documented in 
Hamermesh (1993) and is a standard finding in empirical macroeconomics. Since the 
LCD function is a standard Cobb-Douglas function as far as aggregate employment is 
concerned, this is exactly what it predicts. 
What about the other candidates? Manning (2003) argues that this fact is 
compatible with monopsony as long as the variation in wages is driven by labour supply 
(rather than institutional) shocks. While this is a valid theoretical point, it is hard to 
believe that the variation in wages in the data is dominated by this in periods when 
unemployment has been high and institutional factors have also been important in 
shaping wages. In particular, Gregory's (1995) comparison of the US and Australia, 
which shows a lack of connection between relative wages and employment, also shows 
a textbook relationship between average wages and employment at a time of rising 
unemployment and (in Australia) high nominal wage growth and industrial strikes. It 
also provides a useful corrective to arguments that adjustment lags or the small size of 
wage shocks make it impossible to identify employment effects. 
The efficiency/effort and aggregate demand theories provide no explanation for 
this fact. Indeed, the aggregate demand theory really implies the reverse: it is a theory 
of why average wages do not affect employment at the macroeconomic level (or might 
even have a positive effect), and is perfectly compatible with relative wages affecting 
the employment of smaller groups of workers: 'a special reduction of money-wages is 
always advantageous to an individual entrepreneur or industry' (Keynes 1936: ch.I9). 
The mismeasurement theory would be compatible with this fact, if for some reason, the 
signal/noise ratio was better for average wage data. However, the converse seems more 
plausible: as emphasised in section 2, the relative wage literature covers some quite 
large shocks. It would be hard to find comparably sized, plausibly exogenous changes 
to average wages, let alone ones that are significantly larger. 
STYLIZED FACT 2: Strong labour market institutions are robustly correlated with 
lower wage inequality, but not with higher wage shares. 
In the words of Durlauf and Blume (2008), 'virtually all analyses find that labour 
institutions reduce the dispersion of hourly earnings and the inequality of income.' 
There is no such consensus, however, on the effect of these institutions on the share of 
wages in the total product. The recent trend has been for the less regulated Anglophone 
economies to experience rising wage inequality and small falls in wage shares, while the 
more regulated Europeans (and Japanese) have seen stable wage inequality but large 
falls in wage shares. 
These results, amply illustrated in chapter A4, are confirmed in Tables C.l and 
C.2, which show some simple regressions of wage inequality and the wage share on 
collective bargaining coverage and minimum wages. The same data set of 10 OECD 
countries from 1975-2007 is used (described in further detail in the Data Appendix to 
Part A), h can be seen that both collective bargaining coverage and the minimum wage 
are negatively correlated with wage inequality regardless of the inclusion of year and 
country fixed effects, and even the size of the coefficients are reasonably consistent. 
Even when both variables are included together (not shown), at least one and sometimes 
both are statistically significant, which is surprising given that the two variables are 
highly correlated and potential substitutes for each other. On the other hand, Table C.2 
shows that these institutions are more often than not correlated with lower wage shares. 
The exception is when country fixed effects but not year fixed effects are included, 
reflecting the fact that, on average, both wage shares and institutions have declined over 
the relevant period. Of course, these regressions have potential problems with omitted 
variables and endogeneity, but they certainly shift the burden of proof onto those who 
would argue that these institutions have a strong positive effect on the wage share. 
Table C.l.a: Regressions of wage inequality on collective bargaining. 
Dependent variable; 9/1 earnings decile ratio 
Collective bargaining -0.0158*** -0.0153*** -.0108*** -0.00810*** 
(14.5) (13.8) (8.97) (7.58) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Observations 305 305 305 305 
Countries 10 10 10 10 
Table C.l.b: Regressions of wage inequality on min imum wages. 
Dependent variable: 9/1 earnings decile ratio 
M in imum wage -2.71*** -2.63*** -3.69*** -3.23*** 
(7.18) (6.29) (11.7) (10.6) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Observations 175 175 175 175 
Countries 6 6 6 6 
Table C.2.a: Regressions of wage shares on collective bargaining. 
Dependent variable: wage share 
Collective bargaining -0.0503*** -0.0582*** 0.0033 -0.0431*** 
(4.99) (7.40) (0.16) (3.72) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Observations 356 356 356 356 
Countries 10 10 10 10 
Table C.2.b: Regressions of wage shares on min imum wages. 
Dependent variable: wage share 
M i n imum wage -25 7*** -25.5*** 12.1** -11.4*** 
(6.74) (8.56) (2.11) (3.62) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Observations 183 183 183 183 
Countries 6 6 6 6 
Data used as in Chapter A.4 & Data Appendix to Part A. 
T-statistics in brackets. *** , ** , * indicate 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
Constants estimated but not reported for models with no FE. 
As shown in chapter A4, the inclusion of many other potentially relevant variables does 
not disturb the above results: higher collective bargaining coverage is robustly 
correlated with lower wage inequality (although as a time interaction rather than levels), 
but not with higher wage shares (again the estimates are mostly negative, although often 
insignificant). 
These results are largely consistent with the LCD function, which allows 
institutional wage setting to alter the distribution of wages, but not change the wage 
share, which is a fixed parameter in the production function. (If we take the Cobb-
Douglas part of the LCD function less seriously and allow for an elasticity of 
substitution different from one, then there is no particular prediction for the effect on the 
wage share.) They present a challenge to the monopsony, efficiency wage, and 
aggregate demand theories, in which there is a rent or surplus to the employment 
relationship that is up for grabs between employer and employee. A binding wage floor 
should redistribute income between wages and profits, particularly if it applies to the 
whole economy. One might also speculate that a general strengthening of the 
bargaining power of employees, as opposed to a simple wage floor, would not 
necessarily reduce inequality. Both efficiency wage and monopsony considerations 
seem more, not less relevant, to more highly paid and specialised labour. 
In fact, any explanation which works with homogenous labour must be suspect 
given this fact. The combination of a higher wage and no employment loss implies 
higher wage income, while profits must be lowered (since employers did not find it 
profitable to pay higher wages without regulation). Even if there is some general 
equilibrium effect (e.g. from increased output) which offsets the absolute decline in 
profits, it would have to be large indeed to prevent a decline in the profit (and rise in the 
wage) share. The mismeasurement theory is not inconsistent with this observation, but 
does not provide an explanation for it either. 
STYLIZED FACT 3: Centralised or coordinated bargaining can moderate wage 
demands by unions. 
Imagine a society with a per fec t d ivis ion of labor. Tha t m e a n s per fec t in t e rdependence : every s ingle 
m e m b e r ' s cont r ibut ion of capital or labor is essential if there is to be any p roduc t ion at all, so every 
m e m b e r has an individual capaci ty to s top the who le p roduc t ive mach ine . . . . T h e ask ing-pr ices will 
inevi tably add up to more than the total that the mach ine can p roduce . . . . If the con t ende r s have equal 
capaci t ies to hold o u t . . . they will eventua l ly agree, jus t be fo re they all s tarve to death s imul t aneous ly , to 
work for exact ly equal rewards . 
Stret ton (1976 : 244-245) 
Various hypotheses have been advanced regarding the relationship between collective 
bargaining institutions and macroeconomic performance (particularly unemployment 
and inflation): It has been argued that more centralised or coordinated systems produce 
better outcomes, that there is a U-shaped relationship (with the extremes of 
de/centralisation doing better than the middle ground), or even that there is no 
relationship once the effects of international trade are taken into account. As 
summarised in Flanagan (1999), the evidence is ambiguous. Rankings of centralisation 
and coordination (the distinction is between the formal legal structure and actual 
behaviour) are subjective and ordinal, so that the empirical results are fragile to the 
classification used as well as the time period. Significantly, however, no-one has put 
forward the theory that more centralised or coordinated systems do systematically 
worse, in the sense that they are less conducive to wage restraint and thus produce 
higher inflation and/or unemployment. 
The Appendix to this chapter describes a simple wage bargaining game using the 
LDC function. Intuitively, the larger the number of unions bargaining independently. 
the less elastic the demand for labour they each face, and the higher the wages that they 
set, without regard for the damage this does to employment in other occupations. 
None of the other theories gives a clear reason as to why this would happen. If 
the demand for labour in the aggregate was in fact less elastic than the demand for 
labour in particular occupations or industries, there would be little reason to worry about 
this problem. We would instead have a literature complaining about how unions 
compete in undercutting each other, and calling for coordination to boost wages, not 
moderate them. 
STYLIZED FACT 4: Immigration (or a native underclass) can increase the average 
wages of native workers, yet workers still resist increases in labour supply in their own 
occupations. 
Our wages paid to skilled workers in South Afr ica are far in excess of what are paid in any other count ry 
except Amer i ca and we were |s ic] able to do it because we paid the black man such a low wage . 
Jan Smuts , Pr ime Minis ter of South Afr ica (Lipton 1985: 176). 
Workers want their own work to be rewarded with high wages. But they are also happy 
to see other's work rewarded with low wages, as long as their own jobs are not 
threatened by this. One extreme historical example is Germany in the Second World 
War, when approximately 30% of the industrial and agricultural workforce was foreign: 
'The arrival of a huge class of people in Germany who were by definition inferior to the 
lowest German was plainly of benefit. . . . The lowly German worker could become a 
foreman; the housewife could have servants.' (Rees 2005:334.) Another is apartheid in 
South Africa, where white unions helped create and enforce a complex set of rules 
governing entry into particular occupations by race. Mariotti (2009) describes how 
these rules were manipulated to ensure the maximum benefit for white workers: as their 
educational levels increased and they moved into more skilled jobs, the restrictions on 
Africans in semi-skilled occupations were relaxed. The general principle is the same 
wherever there is an immigrant or native underclass that is tolerated or even valued as 
long as they keep their place, doing jobs the other citizens do not want. Other examples 
can be seen in the many caste systems that have existed since antiquity, the United 
States during Jim Crow, or indeed post-war migration into Australia, in which highly 
qualified professionals were forced to work as manual labourers. At the other end of the 
spectrum, Friedman and Kuznets (1954) argued that doctors ' income was boosted by 
the restriction of entry into the profession. 
Even without such rigid controls, recent analysis of immigration tends to find 
that it does not harm the average wage of native workers,^"* and even the relative wages 
of similar native workers are not too badly affected (see chapter B2). It is interesting to 
note that, while their estimates of wage effects are based on personal characteristics 
(education and experience), Ottaviano and Peri (2005:12-13) explain their f indings with 
reference to the concentration of immigrants in particular occupations: ' foreign born 
workers are highly represented in occupations like tailoring (where 54% were foreign 
born in 2000) and plaster-stucco masoning (where 44% were foreign-born in 2000), 
while U.S.-born workers are highly represented among, say, crane operators (where less 
than 1% was foreign-born in 2000) and sewer-pipe cleaners (where less than 1% [werej 
foreign-born). ' 
The key point is not just that labour supply can be increased without hurting the 
incumbent workers, or even that there exists a certain amount of complementar i ty 
between different types of workers (which is practically automatic if the average wage 
At least when it is a one -o f f level shock and not an increase in the g rowth rate of the labour force . 
is fixed in equilibrium, as seen below in chapter C6). These facts are perfectly 
compatible with a demand for labour that is highly elastic at all levels.^^ It is the 
combination of these facts with the almost universal impulse to keep the new workers in 
their place, to resist an increase in labour supply within particular lines of work. 
This fits perfectly with the LCD funct ion 's properties of complementari ty 
between occupations and inelastic demand within occupations. Conversely, if the 
demand for labour in particular occupations was elastic, there would be little incentive 
to restrict entry, since employment could rise to absorb an increase in labour supply 
without much of a wage penalty. This would be true even in a monopsony or eff iciency 
wage setting. Furthermore, if workers in one occupation were generally good 
substitutes (rather than complements) for workers in other occupations, low wage labour 
even confined to particular jobs would be a threat rather than a benefit to other workers. 
If employment is limited by aggregate demand, on the other hand, one might have an 
argument for why native workers would resist a general increase in labour supply 
(assuming for the moment that the newcomers would not increase demand as well), but 
not for why there should be such a stark contrast in the within- and between- occupation 
effects. 
David C a r d ' s m i n i m u m wage and immigra t ion research migiit seem somewha t incongruous , the one 
seeming ly imply ing an inelastic demand for labour (m in imum wages do not reduce e m p l o y m e n t ) and the 
o ther an elastic d e m a n d ( immigra t ion does not reduce nat ive wages) . These f indings, however , are not 
necessar i ly cont radic tory . T h e y could be expla ined by a m o n o p s o n y model of the labour market with a 
cons tant marginal product of labour, for example . Of course , this essay argues that the m o n o p s o n y 
explanat ion is lacking for o ther reasons, and that the technological hypothes is is to be pre fe r red . 
STYLIZED FACT 5: When unemployment is low, employers and policymakers complain 
of skills shortages. When unemployment is high, they complain of structural 
unemployment. 
While skills shortages and structural unemployment have not received a lot of attention 
from academic economists in recent decades, the concepts have a long history and are 
used regularly in more practical discourse (Hoque and Inder 1991, Morissette and 
Salvas-Bronsard 1993, Ohtake 2004).^^ The idea that the economy needs a supply of 
workers with the right skills in the right proportions and the right locations is apparently 
quite robust. In good times, a shortage of particular types of workers is seen as a brake 
on the entire economy, to be met with selective immigration and focused training efforts 
(Richardson 2007). In bad times, worries arise that unemployment is not due merely to 
insufficient aggregate demand or excessive wages, which are relatively simple (if not 
always easy) to diagnose and treat, but to a more intractable mismatch between the 
skills and geographic location of the labour force and potential employment 
opportunities. 
Although these concepts make intuitive sense, indeed seem somewhat obvious, 
it is worth reflecting on the conditions necessary for them to be valid. If a shortage of a 
particular kind of worker can have consequences for the whole economy, both 
employers and other types of workers, that implies both a certain amount of inelasticity 
in the demand for that type of worker, and a certain amount of complementarity with 
other occupations. The LCD function is a perfect illustration of these properties. 
Indeed, it enables a more rigorous definition of the terms to be given. Structural 
unemployment may be defined as the number of workers in the surplus occupations, as 
^^  'Structural unemployment ' now tends to be used merely as a synonym for the NAIRU. See e.g. 
Backhouse (1997) for the original u.se of the term. 
defined in chapter C2. Skills shortages may be defined as the number of extra workers 
needed in the binding occupations to convert them to surplus occupations. 
Without these properties, however, both terms become almost meaningless. For 
clarity, consider the opposite extreme, where the demand for all kinds of labour is 
infinitely elastic. Employers will happily hire as many workers as present themselves, 
but do not gain economic surplus from a higher level of employment, and there is no 
obvious reason to label a low supply of workers as a shortage. Wages may be high or 
low in a particular line of work, but this is of little concern to anyone except the workers 
themselves. Structural unemployment is almost an impossibility: as long as some 
workers of a certain type are employed, it is possible to expand that employment 
infinitely at the same wage. 
Conditions of monopsony or efficiency wages require some modification to this 
statement, but do not invalidate the main point. Shortages may be said to exist under 
monopsony, in that employers would be willing to expand employment if they did not 
have to simultaneously raise wages, or in the sense that inefficiently low wages may 
cause inefficiently low investment in human capital. Some efficiency wage theories 
predict equilibrium unemployment (e.g. the Shapiro-Stiglitz model). Yet these 
phenomena do not correspond to our concepts of structural unemployment and skills 
shortages. The unemployment under efficiency wages is not the result of there being 
'too many' workers of a particular kind, but of other considerations such as the 
efficiency of monitoring technology and the disutility of effort. And as long as the 
marginal productivity of labour is insensitive to the level of employment, the 
'shortages' under monopsony seem unlikely have the kind of economy-wide or surplus-
destroying effects attached to the concept of a skills shortage. Similarly, the aggregate 
demand theory, on its own, provides no explanation for why some occupations would 
be more affected by unemployment than others. 
Summary 
As well as predicting that employment is insensitive to relative wages, the technological 
theory presented here is also consistent with a range of stylized facts about the labour 
market: the elasticity of employment with respect to average wages, the correlation 
between strong labour market institutions and lower wage inequality, and the lack of 
such a correlation between institutions and wage shares; the moderating effect of 
coordination on centrally bargained wages, the contrasting reaction of workers to labour 
supply inside and outside their own occupations, and the existence of skills shortages 
and structural unemployment. The competing explanations - mismeasurement, 
monopsony, efficiency wages and aggregate demand - are often inconsistent with and 
generally do not predict these facts, as summarised in Table C.3. This is strong, albeit 
indirect, evidence in favour of the technological explanation. 
The common theme in many of these situations is the distinction between 
aggregate labour and average wages on the one hand, and particular occupations and 
relative wages on the other. As argued above, this distinction is at the core of the 
technological explanation, but plays no part in any of the others. 
Table C .3 : S u m m a r y of Theor ies vs. Styl ized Facts . 
Evidence Technology Mismeasurement Monopsony Efficiency 
wage 
Aggregate demand 
1. Effect of average wage 
on employment 
-ve, larger than relative 
wage effect 
-ve, larger than 
relative wage effect 
No different from relative wage effect Smaller than 
relative wage effect 
(or -i-ve) 
2. Effect of institutions on 
vk'age shares & inequality 
Little effect (possibly -ve ) 
on shares, reduce 
inequality 
No effect on shares, 
reduce inequality 
Depends on 
elasticity of 
substitution 
Increase wage share, inequality ? 
3. Effect of coordinated 
wage bargaining 
Moderates wage demands 
(or no effect) 
Moderates wage 
demands 
No effect or increased demands Increased demands 
4. Effect of increased 
labour supply 
Bad for similar workers, 
good for others 
Bad for similar 
workers, good for 
others 
Small effect, little difference between similar workers & others 
5. Skills shortages & 
structural unemployment 
Exist often Well defined, exist 
almost always 
Generally ill-defined, shouldn't exist (see discussion of skills shortages 
under monopsony) 
In order to distinguish between technology and the other theories, the others are presented under the assumption that the demand for labour in particular 
occupations with respect to their relative wages is equally or more elastic than the demand for labour with respect to the average wage. 
Appendix: Collective bargaining and the LCD function 
Suppose that all wages are set by a single monopoly union, which maximises wage 
income WL subject to aggregate labour demand L^. If lF is elastic, this union will set 
the average wage to employ as many workers as possible, i.e. pursue full employment 
(or the fullest possible given mismatches between supply and demand across 
occupations). This means the same average wage and employment as in a competitive 
situation. Relative wages, however, can be anything the union wants (assuming it has 
sufficient control over labour supply), if demand is inelastic for some relevant values of 
the average wage, the equilibrium will be at the top of this range, again with any desired 
pattern of relative wages. 
Now, break up the monopoly union into n parts, one for each occupation.^^ 
Assume that each union plays a simultaneous wage setting game with an unlimited 
supply of labour. The union for occupation j maximises WJLPj with respect to Wj_ 
yielding the first order condition 
+ = (C.7) 
where Ejj -s^E is the own-wage case of equation (C.3). This implies that S j E - \ . 
Each union will target a share of labour income equal to the inverse of the elasticity of 
demand for labour with respect to the average wage. Unions with a smaller share in 
employment (as measured by the a coefficients) will set higher wages to achieve this. 
Equilibrium can only exist if the total wage demands add up to the average wage, which 
is not always possible. 
It would be possible to have some unions covering more than one occupation. Nothing in the 
discussion below would change, except that n would have to be replaced by a smaller number and the a ' s 
combined for the multi-occupational unions. However, since each union targets an equal share of wages 
irrespective of size, there would be little incentive for unions to amalgamate. 
For example, if the capital stock is fixed (see the appendix to chapter C4, Case 
2) then E = (l-<2r) ' and each union will target a ( l - « ) share of labour income. If 
n - (l - a ) ' , there can be an equilibrium at any average wage, with no reference to the 
capital stock. If the number of unions is smaller than this, their wage demands will add 
up to less than the average wage. Their share in wage income is sufficiently large that 
each union will have more to gain by cutting their wage to increase employment rather 
than raising wages to increase their share. However, the supply of labour would 
eventually be limited in some occupation or another. At this point, since employment 
cannot increase further, there is no gain to any union from cutting wages further. As 
long as each union has at least their target share of the average wage, there is no 
incentive for any union to raise their wage either. So there is an equilibrium with a 
determinate average wage and employment (the same as under centralised bargaining or 
perfect competition), and a floor under each union's share of wages, but with an 
indeterminate distribution of the excess ( l - / ? [ l - a ] ) share. 
If the number of unions is larger than the critical value, however, total wage 
demands will always add up to more than the average wage. If it is legitimate to use the 
result of a one-shot simultaneous move game as insight into a dynamic process, one 
could imagine a continuing upward spiral of wages as each union tries to leapfrog the 
others. 
This 'knife-edge' result is, of course, dependent on the exact L C D functional 
form (both the zero substitution between different types of labour and an elasticity of 
unity between aggregate labour and capital), a constant capital stock, unions 
maximising income only, and the game being one-off rather than repeated. The main 
point, which does not depend on these exact assumptions, is simply that smaller unions 
face less elastic demand and therefore have an incentive to set higher wages. 
A similar argument has often been made with respect to inflation - that 
centralised bargaining internalises the welfare effects of the price rises that follow an 
increase in wages. The above is really just a recasting of this argument in real terms. 
The assumption that rising wages in particular occupations or sectors mainly drive up 
prices, instead of destroying employment, implies an inelastic demand for labour. 
CHAPTER C6. EXTENSIONS OF THE LCD 
FUNCTION 
The Leontief /Cobb-Douglas specification used in ciiapter C4 is highly styhzed, as are 
the canonical production functions it is based on. It is employed as the simplest method 
of deriving the desired properties in a mathematically consistent way. However, this 
should not be taken to mean that the most extreme assumptions, particularly that of zero 
substitution between different types of labour, are necessary to give the desired results. 
In this chapter we relax several of the assumptions of the LCD function to create richer 
and more realistic models that still preserve its essential properties. Firstly, we allow 
for substitution between different goods and different types of labour. Secondly, we 
allow for capital-skill complementarity, removing the symmetry between different types 
of labour. Finally, we allow skill levels and productivity to vary among workers within 
each occupation. 
Multiple goods & nonzero substitution 
Consider a model economy in which a number of different goods are produced using 
capital and labour, with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production technology. 
Further suppose that the labour input is itself a CES aggregate of different types of 
labour. Therefore, for each industry we have the production function 
Y = + , (C.8) 
omitting subscripts since we will only deal with one industry at a time. Furthermore, 
the labour input is given by 
L = (C-9) 
,=i 
where, as in the LCD function of chapter C4, L, indicates the amount of labour from 
each different occupation /=1 n. The elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour is a = { \ - p ) ' , and similarly the elasticity of substitution between different 
types of labour is 6* = (l - J ) ' . 
Change in wages in one industry. We now derive the own-wage elasticity of 
demand for any particular occupation, under the assumption that it is a microeconomic 
situation best modelled in terms of the elasticity of product demand and a constant cost 
(i.e. infinitely elastic supply) of capital. This is done simply by iterating the elasticity 
equation from case 1 of the Appendix to chapter C4. In the first iteration, we find Ejj^  
the own-wage elasticity of demand for occupation j, in terms of its share in wage 
income sj, the elasticity of substitution between it and other types of labour, 6, and E, 
the elasticity of demand for the aggregate labour input L with respect to the average 
1 " 
wage : 
(C.IO) 
A one percent rise in the wage of occupation j will raise the average wage by Sj percent 
and thus reduce the demand for all types of labour by sjE. it will also create a 
substitution effect equal to the elasticity of substitution between different types of 
labour multiplied by the share of all occupations other than j in total wages. In other 
words, Ejj is a linear combination of the elasticity of demand for the labour aggregate 
and the elasticity of substitution between different types of labour, converging to the 
first as Sj approaches one, and to the second as Sj approaches zero. Clearly the demand 
for any occupation j will become more elastic as sj rises, as long as ^ + £ < 0 . In other 
words, if the absolute value of the elasticity of demand for the labour aggregate is 
greater than the elasticity of substitution between different types of labour within that 
aggregate. This seems plausible enough, as long as the demand for aggregate labour is 
fairly elastic, and the elasticity of substitution between different types of labour is low. 
In the second iteration, we can simply substitute for E in (C.IO) using the same 
equation, which yields 
( c . i i ) 
where, in the standard notation, 5 is the labour share in total income, a is the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour, and i] is the elasticity of product demand. 
At this point, it is useful to introduce some plausible parameter values. These 
are shown in Table C.4. i] and a are average values from reviews of the literature on 
each subject, while typical values of 5 are taken from Part A of this thesis. (9, the 
elasticity of substitution between different types of labour, is obviously more 
contentious. The given values are for male and female labour (Gregory and Duncan 
1981), and a finer disaggregation also including age and education (Card, Kramarz and 
Lemieux 1999). One may see them simply as plausible values that are low, but mostly 
greater than zero. 
If we apply these values, it is simple to see that an occupation which accounts 
for a negligible share of labour costs in its industry would face an own-wage demand 
elasticity given by -6, which ranges between 0 and -0.3. At the other extreme, workers 
for the industry as a whole would face an elasticity of E = srj - (l - s)a. The parameter 
values in Table C.4 yield values for E between -0.46 and -0.88. Not only does demand 
become more elastic as the share of labour costs increases, but the value for the whole 
T a b l e C.4 : Parameter values for equation (C.l 1). 
Parameter Value Source 
>1 -0.5 Clements (ZOO?)"** 
-1 Anderson e t a l (1997:59) 
a 0.4-0.6 Chirinko (2008) 
s 0.6-0.7 Part A (Figure A.2) 
0 0.3 Gregory and Duncan (1981) 
0-0.16 Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1999) 
industry is still quite inelastic. This shows that, even after introducing realistic amounts 
of substitution both between different goods, and different types of labour in the 
production of those goods, labour demand can be inelastic for significant groups of 
workers. Note also that this is the most unfavourable situation for our hypothesis given 
the discussion in chapter C4: the increase in wages affects one industry only, 
maximising the potential for substitution with other products. 
As an aside, the cross-wage elasticity of demand for any other occupation k with 
respect to u) is 
(C.12) 
(Hamermesh 1993: 35). The scale effect is the same as for the own-wage elasticity, but 
the substitution effect is positive. Based on the values calculated above, the first will 
outweigh the second, so that an increase in the wage in one occupation will reduce the 
demand for workers in other occupations. In this loose sense we may say that the 
occupations are still complements. Technically, however, p-complementari ty usually 
refers to constant output elasticities. In this case we would have to use the constant 
output version of £ = - ( l . Using Table C.4, E would be between -0.24 and -0.12, 
so that Ej^j could be positive for some values of 0. However, the looser sense used above 
Technically, these are compensated and Frisch elasticities, rather than the ordinary (Marshallian) 
elasticity required by equation (C.l 1). However, the difference is only a matter of the expenditure share 
of the good in question. In any case, the bias is towards zero, and we consider -1 as an alternate value. It 
should also be noted that this value is an average for broad product groups (e.g. food), not specific 
commodit ies or branded products. 
seems more practically relevant, if one is wondering whether an increase in wages in 
one occupation is good or bad for workers in other occupations. 
Change in wages in all industries. To calculate the effect of a wage change in 
more than one industry in general equilibrium would require far more information 
and/or assumptions about the production technology used in the different industries, the 
degree of substitution between their products, and the elasticity of supply of the factors 
of production (the microeconomic assumptions of the above exercise no longer being 
appropriate). As a simple illustration, consider the case when all industries have the 
same technology, allowing (C.8) and (C.9) to be a representative production function 
for the entire economy. Assume further that in the long run equilibrium, the average 
wage is constant (see the appendix to chapter A4), and there are only two types of 
labour, skilled and unskilled, so that (C.9) becomes 
L ^ i S ' + U ' / ' . (C.13) 
A rise in the unskilled wage of 1% would increase the average wage by s^j %, where s^ 
is the share of the unskilled in total wages.^*^ To keep the average wage constant, the 
skilled wage must /« / / by (making complementarity between occupations 
practically automatic for any value of 6). Therefore the relative wage of the unskilled 
has risen by (1 + 5 ^ / 5 ^ % . Their relative employment must fall by this amount 
multiplied by 9, the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour. 
Noting that + = 1, we have 
= (C.14) 
U \-s.. 
This fo l lows f rom Shepha rd ' s L e m m a , which states that the der ivat ive of the cost funct ion (average 
wage) with respect to the price of an input (unskilled wage) is equal to the d e m a n d for that input 
(unskil led employment ) . 
As the share of the unskilled approaches zero, this approaches 0. As the share of the 
unskilled approaches one, this approaches infinity (in the limit, it is impossible to raise 
the unskilled wage when labour is entirely unskilled). Thus we see again that demand 
becomes more elastic as the share of wage income increases, even if this time it is only 
in relative terms. 
To find the change in absolute terms, it is necessary to make some additional 
assumption about the supply of skilled labour. If it is completely inelastic, then we can 
simply say that the absolute percentage change in the employment of unskilled labour is 
equal to the relative change, so that the own-wage elasticity of demand for unskilled 
labour is 
(C.15) 
- 1 
The symmetrical result for skilled labour seems less appropriate, since displaced 
skilled labour would probably move into the unskilled sector. Since the type of wage 
floors we consider are mostly binding on the unskilled, however, this caveat does not 
seem particularly important. 
Capital-skill complementarity 
In chapter C4, it was assumed that the relative demand for different occupations was 
exogenous i.e. that the coefficients were constant with respect to all other variables 
within the model. This assumption does not rule out random or deterministic change 
over time from exogenous technological progress or other shocks. However, it is 
generally accepted that capital is a complement for skilled labour (Hamermesh 
1993:135). As we saw in chapter A3, the standard method of modelling this 
complementarity is a production function that nests skilled and unskilled labour 
asymmetrically e.g. g[uj{K,S)] where/and g are CES functions (Krusell et al 2000). 
This method, however, requires quite a high elasticity of substitution between unskilled 
labour and the other factors. In trying to capture the effect of capital accumulation on 
the relative demand for skilled labour, we are forced to make an assumption that seems 
incompatible with the evidence in chapter C2. 
Using a simplified version of the model developed in chapter A3, it is possible 
to incorporate capital-skill complementarity within the LCD function by allowing the 
relative demand for different occupations to change with the capital/labour ratio. Since 
this ratio is in turn a function of the average wage (given whatever assumption is made 
about the capital stock), we can writea, = <7, (W) V/ . Then the occupational wage 
elasticity of demand Ejk from equation (C.3) must be recalculated as 
w. vv, 
By implicitly differentiating (C.2) we find 
dW 
dL'' dW 
a : T 1- L 
dW dw aw dw,. 
dw. 
1 - > vv —-
1=1 dW 
Combining these expressions and rearranging gives 
, W da J ^ 
Ej, = s, 
fl, dW ^ ' dw ;=1 
(C.16) 
where Sk and E are the income share and average wage elasticity from equations (C.4) 
and (C.5). Raising the average wage by raising Wk now has two effects: it changes the 
relative demand for each occupation (the second term in brackets in the numerator is the 
elasticity of relative demand for occupation j with respect to the average wage) as well 
as reducing the total demand for labour. This new elasticity will tend to be larger or 
da 
smaller than s^E depending on whether ^ ^ is negative or positive, i.e. whether a 
higher capital-labour ratio raises or lowers the relative demand for a particular 
occupation. If the relative demand for skilled workers rises with the capital-labour 
ratio, one would expect the own-wage elasticity of demand to be smaller (less negative) 
in more skilled occupations. There is some evidence of this - see Hamermesh 
(1993:118,135). If - ^ = 0 V/then equation (C.16) reduces to (C.3). 
Certain constraints must be imposed to keep the labour units sensible. If the 
a iv 
wage in one occupation rises, ceteris paribus, the average wage should rise, i . e . - — > 0 
du; 
or 
Perhaps a unit of labour should contain the same number of workers at every value of 
K/L. Then 
i f i ^ o . 
The first constraint (C.17) implies that the denominator of (C.16) is always positive. 
(C.18) implies that the denominator is equal to 1 if wages in all occupations are equal. 
If we suppose, however, that raising the average wage tends to raise the relative demand 
for occupations with higher wages (as seems likely with capital-skill complementarity), 
then the denominator would tend to be less than 1. 
This extension of the LCD function preserves the properties that employment in 
all occupations depends only on the average wage, not relative wages, and that the own-
wage elasticity of demand is proportional to the occupation's share of wage income. It 
also preserves p-complementarity between occupations, as can be shown by considering 
the seemingly unrelated question of whether demand curves can slope up. 
The revised elasticity in equation (C.16) seemingly leaves open the possibility 
that Ejk is positive. For any occupation j, this would require 
£ + ^ (C.19) 
a J dW 
The elasticity of a^ (the number of workers of type j required for a single unit of 
aggregate labour L) with respect to the average wage must be positive and greater in 
absolute value than the elasticity of demand for aggregate labour, i.e. the relative 
demand for occupation j must increase faster than the aggregate demand for labour falls. 
This condition does not depend on which wage k rises since a wage rise in any 
occupation only matters insofar as it affects the average wage. So if a cross-wage 
elasticity {Eji, with j ^k ) can be positive, which is less intuitively unreasonable, so can an 
own-wage elasticity Ejj. 
It can be shown, however, that an upward sloping demand curve is incompatible 
with profit maximisation. Consider a change in wages f rom {vv| , . . . ,w„} to 
{vv,',..., w„'}, which results in employment changing from {l, , . . . , L„} to {L, ' , . . . , L„'} 
and output from K to Y'. Now if employers are profit maximising, it must be true that 
at the old wages, the old pattern of employment and output is more profitable than the 
new, and at the new wages, the new pattern of employment and output is more 
profitable than the old. Hence 
and 
Writing A.r for (x'-x) gives 
YwAL>AY 
1=1 
and 
/=i 
Combining the last two conditions implies 
n 
^ A v v , A L , < 0 . (C.20) 
If only one wage j changes, the change in employment for j must be of an opposite sign. 
From the logic above, this implies that cross wage elasticities are also negative i.e. that 
different occupations are still p-complements. 
Heterogenous skills 
If one wishes to incorporate substitution between workers within occupations, it is 
possible to extend the basic LCD function so that workers within an occupation vary in 
their skill levels. For simplicity, we set a, = 1 and also normalise aggregate 
employment to I. Retain Equation (C.I ) as a description of the number of workers in 
each occupation needed for a unit of labour, but define the effective labour input as a 
Cobb-Douglas function of the skill levels of each worker: 
1 
^ = (C.20) 
(=1 
Without loss of generality since occupations can always be sub-divided e.g. violinists with a=2 into 
first and second violinists each with a= \. 
where 5, measures the skill level of worker /. Then in a competit ive labour market, 
assuming that a continuum of skills is available, the marginal product of skill in each 
(X Y occupation, , will be set equal to its marginal cost. More highly skilled workers 
n 5, 
will therefore enjoy higher wages. 
This type of model seems relevant in considering all types of 'superstar ' pay in 
sports, entertainment and business: the relevant calculation is not 'what is the increase 
in revenue with a goalkeeper/soloist/CEO versus without one, all else equal? ' , which is 
the usual marginal product calculation, but 'what is the increase in revenue with this 
superior one vs. that inferior one? ' For example, Gabaix and Landier (2008) argue that 
rising C E O pay can be explained by the growing size of firms, which magnifies the 
absolute difference in profits under more versus less skilled managers. The 
counterfactual of a leaderless firm is not considered, indeed is rather absurd. 
While this model restores the relevance of individual productivity to wages, a 
binding minimum wage will not reduce employment in the affected occupations relative 
to others, since this is still fixed by the definition of the labour units. It would, however, 
create an incentive to hire workers with a higher skill level in the occupation where the 
minimum was binding, if less skilled workers lose their cost advantage. Indulging in 
discrimination would also become cheaper. This is consistent with the common 
argument (e.g. Neumark and Wascher 2006) that racial minorities, the poorly educated, 
and teenagers are more likely to experience negative employment effects f rom 
minimum wages. The corollary is that negative employment effects for particular 
groups do not necessarily mean negative employment effects in the aggregate, since one 
kind of worker is simply being replaced by another. However, if the more highly 
skilled workers are recruited f rom other occupations, this could mean a drop in total 
employment, without particularly affecting the occupation where the wage was raised. 
The same effect could happen in the longer run if workers are diverted from education. 
Summary 
It has been shown in this chapter that the basic hypothesis of inelastic labour demand 
and labour-labour complementarity an occupational level is compatible with a much 
richer range of phenomena than can be captured in the simple LCD function. More 
complex models that allow for realistic amounts of substitution between the products of 
different industries and different types of labour within industries, capital-skill 
complementarity, and heterogenous skills within occupations, can still preserve the 
essential property of the simpler model - that changes in relative wages have very small 
or zero effects on relative employment. In the first two cases, p-complementarity and 
an increasing relationship between an occupation's share of wages and its own wage 
demand elasticity are simple to show as well. 
CHAPTER CI. CONCLUSIONS 
Wage floors are still widespread and politically popular, despite the abandonment of 
price controls in other areas of the economy. Furthermore, there is no consensus, either 
empirical or theoretical, about their employment effects. Empirical studies of minimum 
wages, equal pay laws and other wage setting institutions often fail to find significant 
negative effects, let alone of a consistent size. Theoretically, researchers have put 
forward various monopsony, efficiency wage and effective demand theories as 
alternatives to the price-taking 'neoclassical ' model. 
W e have contended that the findings of insignificant employment effects should 
be taken seriously, but at the same time, the proposed explanations in the literature are 
unsatisfactory. Instead, we propose that the focus should be on the underlying 
substitution possibilities (or lack thereof) in production technology and consumer 
preferences, rather than some peculiarity of the employer-employee relationship. 
Specifically, we argue that the demand for labour at the level of individual occupations 
is much less elastic than the demand for labour in the aggregate. This is a hypothesis 
both about substitution elasticities, and the most relevant way of disaggregating 
' labour ' . It is unusual firstly in emphasising the heterogeneity of labour as an 
explanation for the insensitivity of employment to wages, and secondly, in 
disaggregating labour by occupation rather than personal characteristics. In other 
words, the focus is on the job being done rather than the age, sex or education of the 
worker doing it. 
This hypothesis is modelled using a 'Leontief/Cobb-Douglas' production 
function. As with any aggregate production function, this specification should not be 
taken too literally. The question is whether it is a reasonable first approximation, and 
whether pretending the world works this way yields any useful insights. 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that it is and it does. This simple 
model explains a surprising range of otherwise puzzling empirical evidence. If the 
demand for labour in particular occupations is much less elastic than the demand for 
labour in the aggregate, it is no surprise that minimum wage and equal pay laws, and 
wage setting institutions that compress the wage distribution, have little apparent effect 
on employment. 
The case is strengthened further when other aspects of the labour market are 
considered. Why do average wages seem to have a strong effect on employment when 
relative wages do not? Why do institutional wage floors produce more equal wages, but 
not larger wage shares? Why might collective bargaining by larger groups of workers 
produce wage moderation? Why are increases in labour supply resisted within 
occupations, but welcomed between occupations? Why are there complaints about 
skills shortages in boom times and structural unemployment in slumps? The 
technological hypothesis embodied in the LCD function provides an explanation for all 
of these facts. The other theories considered - mismeasurement, monopsony, efficiency 
wages and aggregate demand- not only have particular problems of their own, but are 
consistent with hardly any of these facts. O f course, these other theories are not thereby 
ruled out as potentially important features of the labour market. They are simply 
insufficient as an explanation for the particular question considered in this paper. 
What policy implications follow from this view of labour demand? Most 
obviously, institutions that raise wages at the bottom of the distribution need not cost a 
large number of jobs as long as they affect a small proportion of total wage income 
(which need not mean a small number of workers), or as long as increases at the bottom 
are matched by restraint elsewhere. This does not mean, however, that their effects are 
entirely benign. It merely means that the key questions are moved to the supply side. 
Will a raise in wages in one occupation attract workers from other occupations or from 
education, potentially displacing less skilled competitors and reducing the overall 
effective labour supply? Will it reduce incentives to acquire education and skills, with 
the same effects (albeit in a longer timeframe)? Will it reduce the hours worked by 
higher-wage individuals, resulting in a decline in demand for services provided by the 
less skilled? 
Incidentally, this focus on supply may provide an answer to the questions with 
which this paper began. Why are price controls in the labour market more popular, and 
their detrimental effects less obvious, than price controls in product markets? Some of 
the answer may be on the demand side - if the elasticity of substitution between 
different types of labour is low, and if there are many different types, it is plausible that 
the elasticity of demand for each of them individually is lower than the elasticity of 
demand for the product they produce. Certainly, inelastic labour demand is a necessary 
condition for wage floors to have desirable effects, by any plausible standard. However, 
the demand for many product groups, particularly staple commodities, is also quite 
inelastic, yet price controls on these products have not been notably successful. The 
answer must surely be on the supply side: the supply of labour as a whole is generally 
considered to be fairly inelastic (some argue that it is even backward bending), while 
the supply of commodities is governed by their marginal cost. Aside from cases where 
there is a naturally limited supply with a great range of extraction costs (such as oil) it is 
plausible that product supply is generally much more elastic than labour supply."^' This 
would also provide a reason for why labour supply has received so much attention and 
labour demand so little. 
These are not radical policy views. Indeed, one of the main strengths of the 
hypothesis put forward in this paper is that its implications are so plausible. From a 
simple set of assumptions, it provides coherent reasons for a range of otherwise 
puzzling features of the labour market, if one has any faith in the powers of human 
reason or trial and error to produce more or less efficient institutions, and in the 
tendency of academic economists to select the most promising fields for study, then it 
should be highly reassuring that the persistence of price controls in the labour market, 
and the relative neglect of labour demand as a field of study, are not productive of large 
deadweight losses. 
" Even for oil, the supply to any individual oil importing country is clearly more elastic than the overall 
supply. 
LAST WORDS 
It would be presumptuous to claim that I have provided definitive answers to questions 
that have been considered by far more distinguished minds before me. Yet I hope that 
raking over these old coals has uncovered a few embers that are still glowing. 
No single, definitive explanation has been advocated in this thesis for why wage 
inequality has recently been rising the most in those countries where wage shares have 
been falling the least. Capital accumulation and the behaviour of top wage incomes 
offer some promise, at least on the grounds of theoretical consistency, but do not seem 
to match the admittedly imperfect data that we have. The behaviour of the wage share 
is more puzzling than that of wage inequality, which seems to fit reasonably well the 
institutional explanations put forward in the literature, perhaps supplemented with a role 
for education. Yet the lack of an obvious explanation should make the puzzle more 
rather than less interesting. If rising wage inequality and falling wage shares are 
considered worthy of extensive attention, surely a strong and previously unnoticed 
relationship between the two trends is also of interest. That the same explanations have 
been commonly put forward for both trends makes the observed correlation between 
them even more suiprising. 
The notes regarding labour demand elasticities and immigration may seem to be 
of fairly specific and limited applicability. Yet they contain a more general message: 
labour being a derived demand, an accurate estimate of a single parameter (which can 
be difficult enough to obtain) is almost never sufficient in order to answer a question of 
practical interest. Refinements of such estimates (e.g. of the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and aggregate labour, or immigrant and non immigrant workers within 
a part icular educat ion and skill class) are of ten less important than the explici t or 
implicit assumpt ions lurking in the background (that a mic roeconomic fo rmula 
developed for individual industries can be applied to an entire country, or that the rate of 
return on capital will remain constant despite an increase in the rate of growth of the 
labour force). 
On the final question, the apparent insensitivity of employmen t to relative 
wages, we have made a more defini te argument . Rather than concentra t ing on the 
peculiar features of the employment relationship, it is worth taking another look at the 
substitution possibilities in production technology and consumer preferences , 
particularly with regards to the division of homogeneous ' l abour ' into different 
occupat ions. A focus on the work being done may be more frui tful for these purposes 
than the personal characterist ics of individual workers . W e have seen that this approach 
is consistent with plausible values of substitution elasticities, as well as being a better fit 
than its compet i tors to many stylized facts about the labour market . 
A final note on methodology may be in order. The studies in this vo lume might 
seem somewhat unsatisfactory, by contemporary standards, in the nature and quali ty of 
the evidence used, the multiplicity of theories considered, and the tentative nature of 
their conclusions. It is worth reminding ourselves that decisive exper iments be tween 
two (and only two) contending theories are a beautiful and rare thing even in the natural 
sciences. While we should take m a x i m u m advantage of any such oppor tuni ty a f forded 
us by history (or generous fund ing of randomised trials), we must also accept that, on 
some important questions, these opportuni t ies come rarely or not at all. In these 
situations, we must fall back on circumstantial evidence f rom as wide a range of sources 
as possible, and accept the consequent diminut ion in the certainty and precision of our 
knowledge. This approach, with ail its limitations, seems superior to pure, corrosive 
scepticism, reliance on ever more baroque theories which can only be calibrated rather 
than tested, or refusal to grapple with the questions at all. 
rn^m. 
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